HOW THE WORLD WAS WON OVER
by John Pilger from his book ‘Distant Voices’, 1992

 

IT IS ONE year since the United States and its coalition
allies attacked Iraq. The full cost has now been summarised
in a report published by the Medical Educational Trust іn
London. (92) Up to a quarter of a million people were killed or
died during and immediately after the attack. As a direct
result, child mortality in Iraq has doubled; 170,000 under-
fives are expected to die in the coming months. This estimate
is described as ‘conservative’; UNICEF says five million
children could die in the region.

More than 1.8 million people have been forced from their
homes, and Iraq’s electricity, water, sewage, communi-
cations, health, agriculture and industrial infrastructure have
been ‘substantially destroyed’, producing ‘conditions for
famine and epidemics’. Add to this the equivalent of a natural
disaster in 40 low-and middle-income countries.” (93)

How were these historic events set in train? Forgotten facts
tell us much. On October 29, 1990, US Secretary of State
James Baker declared, ‘After a long period of stagnation, the
United Nations is becoming a more effective organisation.
The ideals of the United Nations Charter are becoming realit-
ies.’

Within a month Baker had tailored the ideals of the UN
Charter entirely to suit American interests. He had met the
foreign minister of each of the 14 member countries of the
UN Security Council and persuaded the large majority to vote
for the ‘war resolution’ – 678 – which had no basis in the
UN Charter.

Such a vote, remarked Yemen’s UN Ambassador
Abdallah al-Ashtal, was inconceivable without ‘all kinds of
pressures — and inducements’. (94)

So came about the dawn of what is celebrated by Western
commentators as the United Nations’ ‘new age’. In fact, it
was one of the most shameful chapters in the Organisation’s
history. For the first time, the full UN Security Council
capitulated to the War Party and abandoned its commitment
to advancing peaceful and diplomatic solutions.

Throughout the crisis, the UN Security Council ignored and
contravenedits own charter; it merely served up the appearance
of inter-national legality, a truth that became spectacularly
clearwhen the bombing began in January. It was then that the
United States withdrew its embrace of the United Nations
and actively, and illegally, prevented the Security Council
from meeting.

But this degree of control was possible only through a
campaign of bribery, blackmail and threats. It is no secret
that rewards were provided to certain Arab states for their
participation in the ‘coalition’. US News and World Report,
in an article entitled ‘Counting on New Friends’, described
how James Baker had ‘cajoled, bullied and horse-traded his
way’ to get Resolution 678 through the Security Council.
Several of the larger deals — for example, the ‘inducements’
to Egypt and China — were widely publicised. (95)

Some commentators even expressed moral qualms about
‘distasteful bargains’ with the ‘butchers of Beijing’, the
‘loathesome Assad’ and other unsavoury clients, although the con-
cern was clearly that such deals might impede the course of
US war policy; the tactics themselves were barely questioned.
Thus, the full extent of the deals has remained secret. For
the record, I offer here a beginner’s guide to the greatest
bribes in history.

Turkey. Right from the beginning the Turkish regime knew
that it was on to a winner. Based just across the border,
American planes could bomb Iraq with impunity. By November
3, 1990, the promised booty was pouring іп and President
Turgut Ozal celebrated in a public address. ‘In a way,’ he
Said we have benefited from this crisis and made very
significant progress towards our goal of modernising and
strengthening our armed forces’. (96)

Ozal boasted that Turkey received at least $8 billion worth
of military gifts from the United States, including tanks,
planes, helicopters and ships. According to Steve Sherman of
Middle East International, the United States also pledged to
speed up the delivery of Phantom bombers delayed by the
pro-Greek lobby in Washington; and the US Export Import
Bank agreed to underwrite the construction of a Sikorsky
helicopter factory in Turkey: itself worth about a billion
dollars to the Turkish regime.” (97)

In his November 3 speech President Ozal said: ‘We are on
the brink of finding new markets for Turkish goods and
Turkish industry.’ Five days later Turkey was told that its
quota of US textile exports would increase by 50 per cent.
At Washington’s urging, the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund (IMF) ‘freed up’ some $1.5 billion in low-
cost loans to Turkey and dropped the initial condition that
the government would have to cut subsidies. George Bush
personally promised to back Turkey’s application to join
the European Community, which still has questions about
Turkey’s human rights record.” (98)

There were ‘human rights pay-offs’ too. Just because Bush
and Major suddenly adopted, and almost as quickly dropped,
the Iraqi-battered Kurds did not mean they would show
concern for the treatment of Turkish Kurds. The routine
persecutions carried out by the Turkish regime continued
unnoticed; and continue today.

Egypt. In 1990, Egypt was the most indebted country in
Africa and the Middle East. According to the World Bank,
the government of President Mubarak owed nearly $50
billion.” (99). Baker offered a bribe, or ‘forgiveness’ of $14 billion.
Under pressure from the United States, other governments —
Saudi Arabia and Canada among them – ‘forgave’ or post-
Poned most of the balance of Egypt’s debt. (100)

Syria. The main exchange in the deal with President Hafez
Assad was Washington’s go-ahead for him to wipe out 6
Opposition to Syria’s rule in Lebanon. To help him achieve
this, a billion dollars’ worth of arms aid was made available
through а variety of back doors, mostly Gulf States. (101) Although
on America’s list of ‘sponsors of terrorism’, Assad and his Ba’athist
fascists — not dissimilar to Saddam Hussein’s fascists — were
given a quick paint job in time to supportAmerica’s war. ‘Photo
opportunities’ were arranged with Baker and Bush; the locked smiles
told all, as ‘old friends were reunited. (102)

Israel. The ‘pacification’ of Israel was vital if the United
States was to preserve its Arab ‘coalition’. The regular $5
billion America gives to Israel clearly was not going to be
enough; and Israeli Finance Minister Yitzhak Modai told US
Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger that Israel
wanted at least another $13 billion. Israel agreed to a down-
payment of $650 million in cash, and to wait for the $10
billion loan guarantees until later. This partly explains why
the Israelis appear not to give a damn about current American
‘warnings’ as they expel still more Palestinians and build still
more homes for Russian Jews in the occupied territories.’ (103)

Iran. In return for Iran’s support in the blockade of Iraq,
America dropped its opposition to World Bank loans. On
January 9, Reuter reported that Iran was expected ‘to be
rewarded for its support of the US . . . with its first loan from
the World Bank since the 1979 Islamic revolution’. The Bank
approved $250 million the day before the ground attack was
launched against Iraq.

Last November, Britain restored diplomatic ties with Iran,
in spite of the fact that the death sentence on Salman Rushdie,
a British citizen, had just been reaffirmed.

Soviet Union. With its wrecked economy, the Soviet Union
was easy prey for a bribe — even though President Gorbachev
strongly preferred sanctions.

The Bush administration регsuaded the Saudi Foreign Minister,
Sa’ud al-Faysalwe, to go to Moscow and offer a billion dollar
bribe before the Russian winter set in. (104) Once Gorbachev had agreed
to Resolution 678, another $3 billion materialised from other Gulf
states: The day after the UN vote, Bush announced that the United
States would review its Policy on food aid and agricultural
credits to the Soviet Union. (105)

The Soviet Union’s impotence in the face of this degree of
American pressure was illustrated when an American
reporter, Phyllis Bennis, cornered the Soviet Ambassador to
the United Nations, Yuli Vorontsov, in а lift the night the
American bombing started. She asked him if he was concerned
that a war was being fought in his government’s name
He replied with a sigh: ‘Who are we to say they should not?’ (106)

China. In exchange for China’s vote on Resolution 678,
the United States arranged China’s return to diplomatic legit-
imacy. The first World Bank loan since the Tiananmen
Square massacre was approved. On November 30, the day
after the UN vote, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen arrived in
Washington for a ‘high profile’ meeting with Bush and Baker.
More photo Opportunities; more frozen smiles. Within a
week, more than $114 million of World Bank money was
deposited in Beijing. (107)

The impact of the bribes inside China was explained by
the scholar Liu Binyan. ‘For quite some time’, he said, ‘there
has been much talk of formal charges and trials being brought
against the dissidents, but the pressure from abroad pre-
vented it. Since August, however, Beijing has skilfully
manipulated the Iraqi crisis to its advantage and rescued itself
from being the pariah of the world.’ (108)

The vote of the non-permanent members of the Security
Council was crucial; and the following bribes. and threats
were successful. Within a fortnight of the UN vote, Ethiopia
and the United States signed their first investment deal fог
years; and talks began with the World Bank and the IMF.
Zaire was offered US military aid and debt ‘forgiveness and
in return acted for the United States in silencing the Security
Council after the war began. Occupying the rotating presidency
of the council, Zaire refused requests from Cuba, Yemen and India
to convene the Security Council, even though it had no power to
refuse them under the UN Charter. (109)

Only Cuba and Yemen held out. Minutes after Yemen voted
against the resolution, a Senior American diplomat was
instructed to tell the Yemeni ambassador, ‘That was the most
expensive “no” vote you ever cast.’ Within three days, a US
aid programme of $70 million to one of the world’s poorest
countries was stopped. There were suddenly problems with
the World Bank and the IMF; and 800,000 Yemeni workers
were expelled from Saudi Arabia. The ‘no’ vote probably
cost Yemen about a billion dollars, which meant inestimable
suffering for its people. (110)

The ferocity of the American-led attack far exceeded the
mandate of Resolution 678, which did not allow for the
destruction of Iraq’s infrastructure and economy. The law-
lessness did not end there. Five days after 678 was passed,
the General Assembly voted 141 to 1 reaffirming the ban on
attacks on nuclear facilities. On January 17, the United States
bombed nuclear facilities in Iraq, including two reactors
twelve miles from Baghdad.

When the Security Council finally convened a meeting in
February, the United States and its allies forced it to be held
in secret, one of the few times this has ever happened. And
when the United States turned back to the United Nations,
seeking another resolution to blockade Iraq, the two new
members of the Security Council were duly coerced. Ecuador
was warned — by the US ambassador in Quito — about the
‘devastating. economic consequences’ of a no vote. Zim-
babwe, whose foreign minister had earlier described the resol-
ution as ‘a violation of the sovereignty of Iraq’, finally voted
in favour after he was reminded that in a few weeks’ time he
was due to meet potential IMF donors in Paris. Neighbouring
Zambia has had great difficulty negotiating IMF loans — in
spite of democratic reforms. Zambia opposed the resol-
ution. (111) The punishment was most severe against those
impoverished countries that supported Iraq; Sudan, though
in the grip of a famine, was denied a shipment of food
aid. (112)

 

The other day I interviewed Ramsey Clark, whose war crimes
commission has sought to establish the illegality of
the Gulf War. ‘Not only were the articles of the United Nations
Disregarded’ he said, ‘but every article of the Geneva
Convention was broken.

Of course it’s not easy to persuade people to stand up
against power: but when they do, there are successes.
During the Vietnam War the issue of legality prevented
military personnel going who did want to go, and
defended the publication of the Pentagon Papers, which
gave us much of the truth about the war. What we need
urgently is a permanent international tribunal, indepen-
dent of the UN and similar to the International Court
of Justice. Without that, we shall always have victor’s
justice, the perpetrators of crimes will never be called to
account and there will be more and more illegal wars.

None of these issues was widely debated before, during or
after the Gulf War. Getting Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait
skilfully and without putting to death thousands of people —
the same people who were oppressed by him — was only of
marginal interest to the Western media. Censorship was, |
always, less by commission than omission.

As Peter Lennon later wrote in the Guardian:
‘War engenders corruption in all directions. As the
broadcasters were arranging the terms of the stay in
Saudi Arabia, Amnesty published an account of torture,
detention and arbitrary arrests by the Saudis. Twenty
thousand Yemenis were being deported every dey –
up to 800 had been tortured or ill-treated. Neither the
BBC nor ITV reported this . . . It is common knowledge
in television that fear of not being granted visas was
the only consideration in withholding coverage of that
embarrassing story.’ (113)

Other media people who sat red-eyed in studios dropped
the last veil of their ‘impartiality’. Who can forget,
On the first day of the bombing, the Sir Michael and David
Show on BBC Television? There sat David Dimbleby with
Sir Michael Armitage, former head of Defence Intelligence,
as if they were in their club. Sir Michael’s distinguished
career made him an expert on black propaganda in the cause
of Queen and Country; and here he was being offered up as
source of information to the British people. The British,
opined Sir Michael, were super and brave, while the Iraqis
were ‘fanatics holding out’.

For his part, Dimbleby could barely contain himself, He
lauded the ‘accuracy’ of the bombing as ‘quite phenomenal’,
which was nonsense, as we now know. Only a fraction of
the bombs dropped on Iraq hit their target. Where was the
broadcaster’s professional scepticism?

Growing ever more excited, Dimbleby interviewed the
American ambassador to Britain and declared that the ‘suc-
cess’ of the bombing ‘suggests that America’s ability to react
militarily has really become quite extraordinary, despite all
the critics beforehand who said it will never work out like
that. You are now able to claim that you can act precisely
and therefore — to use that hideous word about warfare –
surgically!’ Thereupon Dimbleby pronounced himself
‘relieved at the amazing success’ of it all. (114)

Fortunately, there are some journalists who see their craft
very differently. Thanks to Richard Norton-Taylor, David
Pallister, Paul Foot, David Hellier, Rosie Waterhouse, David
Rose and others, we can now comprehend the scale of the
duplicity and hypocrisy that underpinned the ‘famous victory’.

We now know that the British Government allowed British
firms to break the embargo against Iraq: to continue produc-
ing vital parts for the famed ‘supergun’ and other weapons
supplied to Iraq only months before Saddam Hussein invaded
Kuwait. We now know that shells for the guns that were
trained on British troops came from British-made machines.
We now know that, in spite of an investigation by a House
of Commons Select Committee, there was and remains a
cover-up of ministerial wrong-doing. (115)

This no more than mirrors the cover-ip by those who ran the 8
war in Washington. Thanks mostly to one maverick
Congressman, Henry Gonzalez, chairman of the House Bankng Committee,
we now have detail of how George Bush, as president and vice-president,
secretly and illegally, set out to support and placate
Saddam Hussein right up to the invasion. According to classified
documents, Bush personally directed the appeasement of Saddam
and misled Congress and US intelligence was secretly fed to
Saddam. ‘Behind closed doors,’ says the Gonzalez indictment:

‘Bush courted Saddam Hussein with a reckless abandon
that ended in war and the deaths of dozens of our brave
soldiers and over 200,000 Muslims, Iraqis and others.
With the backing of the President, the State Department
and National Security Council staff conspired in 1989
and 1990 to keep the flow of US credit; technology and
intelligence information flowing to Iraq despite repeated
warnings by several other agencies and the availability
of abundant evidence that Iraq used [US bank] loans to
pay for US technology destined for Iraq’s missile, nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons programmes.” (116)

It is clear that in the summer of 1990 George Bush believed
that Saddam Hussein — his ‘man’, the dictator he backed
against the mullahs in Iran and trusted to guard America’s
interests — had betrayed him. It also seems clear Bush believed
that if his appeasement of Saddam ever got out, the invasion
of Kuwait might be blamed on him personally – hence the
magnitude of his military response. To cover himself, the
price was carnage, which he described as ‘the greatest moral
crusade since World War Two’.

January 17, 1992 to May 1992

 

Footnotes