The Times UK, Tuesday, August 1, 1995
Bosnian Strategists Decide War Pays
Military Option
THE intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Croatian Army, and the evident panic among both the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs. may have helped to convince the Bosnian Government that it can win the war with the Serbs.
Senior Western diplomats said yesterday that the Bosnian Government appeared to have judged some time ago that the military option was becoming more feasible and that events had underlined the view that it was in its interests to continue the war.
Western governments who have contributed troops to the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Bosnia are resolved to stay for another winter, but this resolution could weaken if it becomes clear that none of the warring parties is interested in seeking a peaceful settlement.
Western diplomats believe the Bosnian Government has several reasons for concluding that war offers more chance of a better long-term settlement than Western peace initiatives. This conclusion flies in the face of statements by Western foreign and defence ministers who insist the war can be resolved only by peaceful negotiation. The political judgment also runs counter to Muslim setbacks in Srebrenica and Zepa, and in Sarajevo where June’s “offensive” against Serb positions round the capital ran out of steam after three days. However, setbacks in Bosnia can be quickly turned to political and military advantage. There is increasing conviction in the West that the fall of Srebrenica without much of a fight, was part of a wider Bosnian government policy.
The first Serb assault on the enclave involved only about 200 soldiers backed by five tanks, yet the Bosnian Government (BiH) commanders and a large number of the Muslim defenders abandoned the town before the Serbs breached the perimeter, a sign that a decision had been made to sacrifice Srebrenica for the sake of a political strategy – to force the West into action to “save” Gorazde.
Suspicions that this was a deliberate ploy appear to have been confirmed when the BiH not only insisted on directing Srebrenica refugees to the cramped tented quarters at Tuzla airport, but refused to let them move from the air base until the world had had its fill of the appalling conditions.
If that was the strategy, it worked. Srebrenica’s fall led to Gorazde being “ring-fenced” by the threat of “massive” Nato airstrikes and the deployment of the multinational brigade element of the UN Rapid Reaction force on Mount Igman overlooking Sarajevo. When the Croatian Serbs in Krajina launched their attack on the Bihac enclave, it seemed that the Serbs had wrong-footed the alliance by striking at an area where Nato was unready to mount bombing raids. This time the Bosnian Government was rescued by Zagreb, which saw a golden opportunity to launch the offensive across its borders it had marked down for the autumn.
The West effectively turned a blind eye because Zagreb claimed to be helping out the BiH under fire in the Bihac enclave. The timing was perfect, not only for the Croatians who have been able to seize back territory in occupied Croatia from a demoralized Krajina Serb army, but also for the Bosnian Government which, for all intents and purposes, now has Zagreb and Nato on its side.
With the new Western resolve to deter further Serb aggression in some, if not all, of the UN safe areas. and with the Bosnian Croats and Croatian troops on the offensive, drawing Serb forces away from their already thin front lines elsewhere, the BiH can contemplate a new campaign to win back lands lost in the past 3 ½ years.
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