http:\/\/www.osce.org\/kosovo\/reports\/hr\/part1\/p5sti.htm<\/a>) shed light
\non the background leading to the police action and on the extent
\nof the civilian nature of the inhabitants of the village of Racak.
\nFrom a resum\u00e9 of this report by Diana Johnstone one arrives at the
\nfollowing picture:<\/p>\nRacak, a village strategically located only half a kilometer south
\nof the crossroads town of Stimlje, where the main road between Ko-
\nsovo’s two main cities, Pristina and Prizren, connects to a
\nsouthern turnoff to the important town of Urosevac on the road to
\nthe Macedonian capital of Skopje, had been abandoned by its 2,000
\ninhabitants and occupied by only about 350 people. Racak was un-
\nquestionably a KLA stronghold when attacked by Serb police on 15
\nJanuary 1999. The KVM was quite aware of the KLA presence in Ra-
\ncak: “The KLA was there, with a base near the power plant”. The
\nvillage was surrounded by trenches, a common practice of the KLA
\nwhich turned the villages it occupied into fortresses.<\/p>\n
The KVM also knew that the KLA had been carrying out armed am-
\nbushes, abductions and murders nearby for several months. “A num-
\nber of Kosovo Serbs were kidnapped in the Stimlje region, mostly
\nduring the summer of 1998”, the KVM report notes (p.353). Mo-
\nreover, the local KLA regularly abducted Kosovo Albanians in an
\nobvious effort to establish the rebels’ power over the Albanian
\ncommunity.<\/p>\n
A month before the police raid, on December 12, 1998, the KLA
\n“arrested” nine Albanians for various offenses: “prostitution”,
\n“friendly relations with Serbs” and “spying”. Rather than release
\nthem, the KLA told the KVM that the kidnapped civilians were
\n“waiting to be sentenced” and generously granted their families
\nthe right to send them gift packages. Subsequently, first six and
\nthen two more Albanians were abducted by the KLA for a total of 17
\nmissing persons. (This behavior never ceased but is not viewed in
\nthe general (western) public as reprehensible. The KVM reports
\nthat the KLA even took advantage of the February 11 funeral for
\nRacak victims, attended by Walker, world media and thousands of
\nAlbanians, to kidnap nine Kosovo Albanians accused of such crimes
\nas “having a brother working with the police; being suspected of
\nhaving weapons; drinking with Serbs; having Serb friends; or ha-
\nving a Serb police officer as a friend”.) Little of this informa-
\ntion was “newsworthy” for the “western” media, only on the lookout
\nfor “atrocities” – real or imagined – committed by Serbs.
\nJanuary 8, a KLA armed ambush on police vehicles left three poli-
\ncemen dead and one wounded. Three Kosovo Albanians in a passing
\ntaxi were wounded in the same ambush. “The ambush was well prepa-
\nred: there was a camouflaged firing position for up to 15 men,
\nwhich had been occupied for several days, and small arms, heavy
\nmachine-guns and rocket-propelled grenades were fired at the po-
\nlice convoy”, the KVM reported (p.354).<\/p>\n
On January 10, yet another policeman was fatally wounded in an am-
\nbush south of Stimlje. It was at this point that the Serbian po-
\nlice prepared their operation against the KLA base in Racak.<\/p>\n
During the battle that took place, several KLA fighters were kil-
\nled. The “Berliner Zeitung” (March 24, 2000) reports:<\/p>\n
Already on the morning of January 16, the KLA announced in
\nan initial communique, that eight of its fighters fell in
\ncombat around Racak. The names of these casualties do not
\nappear among the names listed by the Tribunal in The Hague.
\nJust as strange: Also on January 16, the KLA gave the names
\nof 22 people who had been executed in Racak. Of these only
\neleven of those listed, appear in the protocol of the Tri-
\nbunal. Only the number 22 comes close to the number of those
\nfound on the hill behind Racak. (…) KLA leader Hashim
\nThaci declared recently in the BBC: “We had a key unit in
\nthe area. It was a wild battle. We lost a lot of people. But
\nthe Serbs did also.”<\/p>\n
Serbian authorities have always insisted that the dead found in
\nRacak, were KLA fighters who were killed in battle. Since the
\nautopsies carried out by a team of Serbian and Belarus patholo-
\ngists were not considered “sufficiently credible” by western go-
\nvernments and their media, the European Union (EU) called in an
\n“independent” team from Finland, which was accepted by the Yugos-
\nlav government.<\/p>\n
Execution – or Battlefield deaths?<\/p>\n
The final report of the EU’s pathological expert team from
\nFinland, which investigated the causes of death of the bodies
\nfound in Racak, was completed at the beginning of March 1999.
\nIt would take Helena Ranta, the team’s coordinatrice, another
\ntwo weeks before she would confront the press.<\/p>\n
From information in the “Berliner Zeitung” (March 10, 16, and
\n19, ’99) and “Die Welt” (March 8, ’99) evolves the following
\npicture:<\/p>\n
The EU had the publication of the final report postponed re-
\npeatedly. March 5 became March 8, the date Ranta said she
\nwould submit the report to the German EU Council Presidency
\nand added that “the German Foreign Ministry has taken respon-
\nsibility for deciding whether the report would be made public
\nor not.” A spokesperson for the ministry announced that only
\nafter the report had been submitted would “there be further
\nthought about what comes next, how and when it will be made
\npublic.”<\/p>\n
Even though Helena Ranta explained March 2, that no more than
\n3 days would be required to wrap up the finishing touches on
\nthe report, the March 8 submission of the report was also
\ncanceled. Because of “unsolved technical details” the exper-
\ntise on Racak had to remain in the hands of the team of ex-
\nperts for at least another week, announced the Finnish For-
\neign Minister, Ms. Tarja Halonen.<\/p>\n
According to circles within the OSCE, the Finnish expertise,
\nwas at first withheld out of deference to the negotiations in
\nRambouillet. Only after repeated inquiry in Helsinki and Bonn
\nand pressure from within the OSCE, did the German EU presi-
\ndency declare that the report would be handed over March 17,
\n– possibly in the assumption that the Kosovo Conference’s se-
\ncond round – having been originally planned to be limited to
\nMarch 15 – would in any case be over.<\/p>\n
Just before the expertise was to be officially handed over,
\nthe “Washington Post”, in an apparent attempt set the tone of
\nthe atmosphere, reported that the report confirmed that a
\nmassacre had taken place in Racak. As the “Berliner Zeitung”
\n(March 19, 1999) observed: “Observers saw in this a direct
\nlink to the hard negotiation line followed by the US in Paris
\nand were reminded of the role played by this journal in the
\npropagandistic preparations for the Gulf War 1991.”<\/p>\n
“Whether it was a massacre, no one wants to know anymore” was
\nthe headline in the German journal “Die Welt” and quoted an
\nOSCE diplomat in Vienna as saying: “This report is a hot po-
\ntato, that no one wants to touch.” The head of the OSCE mis-
\nsion, William Walker, had again in February repeated, “It
\nwill be confirmed that it was a massacre by the Serbs.”<\/p>\n
March 13 the “Berliner Zeitung” titled its article “OSCE re-
\npresentatives prove Walker wrong” and reported:<\/p>\n
“The head of the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo,
\nthe US American, William Walker, should be replaced as
\nsoon as possible – according to the wishes of several
\nEuropean states. As the “Berliner Zeitung” learned in
\nthe lead up to the negotiations from OSCE sources in
\nVienna, Germany, Italy and Austria demanded that
\nWalker leave. According to these sources, high ranking
\nEuropean OSCE representatives have the evidence that
\nthe 45 Albanians found in Racak in mid-January were
\nnot civilian victims of a Serbian massacre, as Walker
\nalleges.<\/p>\n
According to the OSCE, inside the organization it has
\nlong since taken for granted that Racak “was a hoax
\narranged by the Albanian side.” This conclusion was
\narrived at on the basis of data from the communication
\ncenter of the Kosovo Mission, in other words in-
\ndependently from the awaited expertise of Ms. Ranta’s
\nteam of experts. “Most of the dead were gathered from
\na wide radius around Racak and deposited where they
\nwere later found.” Most of the Albanians died in com-
\nbat under fire from Serbian artillery. Many were
\n“subsequently dressed in civilian clothes” according
\nto a representative of the OSCE.<\/p>\n
This evidence concords with the Serbian version of
\nevents in Racak: that the Albanians were killed in
\ncombat between the KLA and Serbian units, and the
\nscene of a massacre arranged afterward from the Alba-
\nnians.”<\/p>\n
Up to the very end, Helena Ranta did not know if her team’s
\ninvestigation results would be made public, “The decision
\nwill be made at the last minute when we see what happens at
\nKosovo Negotiations in Paris.”<\/p>\n
From the time Helena Ranta took on the job as head of the ex-
\npert team, she repeatedly under pressure particularly from
\nthe German government which at the time was president of the
\nEU Council. Also at the press conference March 17 in Pri-
\nstina, where the final report of the Finnish team was suppo-
\nsed to be transmitted to the German presidency of the EU
\nCouncil and the Serbian Circuit Court, she had to follow the
\nGerman ambassador’s instructions when she responded to que-
\nstions from the media. (“Berliner Zeitung”, 16.3.99)<\/p>\n
March 17 a written press statement was distributed that had
\nbeen prepared by the press department of the foreign ministry
\nin Bonn. The statement announced that on the same day, Dr.
\nHelena Ranta would transmit the Finnish forensic team’s final
\nreport to the relevant Serbian officials. The following 5 pa-
\nges are comments that were introduced with the following:<\/p>\n
“These comments are based upon the investigation of the EU
\nteam’s forensic expert in Pristina, as approved by the Cir-
\ncuit Court of Pristina in accordance with the Yugoslav penal
\nprocess standards. (…) The comments reflect the personal
\nopinion of the author, Dr. Helena Ranta and do not represent
\nan authorized statement from the Pathological Medicine sec-
\ntion of the Helsinki University or the EU forensic experts.<\/p>\n
These comments and the answers given by Helena Ranta during
\nthe press conference in Pristina, were in the decisive points
\nkept so vague that no clear-cut conclusions could be drawn.
\nShe declared “the garments most probably had neither been
\nchanged nor removed”. This answer to the question of whether
\na number of the dead had not been originally wearing KLA uni-
\nforms, as the Serbian side claims, is left as inconclusive as
\nthat of the time of the victims’ death. According to Ranta,
\n“at best, it could be ascertained that the victims appear to
\nhave died at around the same time.<\/p>\n
Was it a “massacre”? Helena Ranta does not want to answer,
\nbecause “such a conclusion is not within the EU pathological
\nteam’s competence. She refuted the “Washington Post’s” ar-
\nticle, according to which the results of their investigation
\nconfirm that a massacre had taken place in Racak. Under pres-
\nsure of persisting questioning she stated that the dead of
\nRacak were victims of a “crime against humanity”. The possi-
\nbility that the dead were inhabitants of Racak, who could
\nhave gotten caught in a cross fire between Serbian units and
\nthe KLA, she also did not want to exclude. Ranta also did not
\ncontradict the Yugoslavian and Belarus pathological experts,
\nwhose investigation arrived at the conclusion that the vic-
\ntims had not been shot at close range.<\/p>\n
The Pathologist Branimir Aleksandric, at the University in
\nBelgrade stated after Helena Ranta’s press conference that
\nshe had only spoken in her name as a private person and had
\nnot reflected the views of the Finnish team, led by the world
\nrenowned Pathologist Antti Penttil\u00e4. From the medical stand-
\npoint, her answers were kept so vague so, one could surmise,
\nas if she wanted to avoid contradicting William Walker and
\nthose who pull his strings. Her answers show also that she
\ndoes not know about gunshot wounds. “She is a dentist by pro-
\nfession. Her expertise in forensic medicine is limited to
\nidentification. She is not competent therefore to give an
\nopinion on the mechanics of inflicting injuries, which is
\nwhat the Yugoslav, Belarus and Finnish pathologists were
\nentrusted with doing in their medical examination of the Ra-
\ncak bodies.” Her comments and answers along with the fact
\nthat her name was missing on the 40 individual findings of
\nthe Finnish team shows that their is a gulf between the pro-
\nfessional and the political in the Finnish team. (“Tanjug”,
\nMarch 8, 1999)<\/p>\n
Yugoslav and Belarus pathologists published the results of
\ntheir investigations already in February. These were carried
\nout in accord with the Finnish pathologists, even though at
\nthe time they did not sign the reports. To consider the refu-
\nsal of the Finnish experts’ signatures as resulting from a
\ndifference of opinion was repudiated by Helena Ranta, who in-
\nsisted that on the professional level there was no problems
\nin cooperation and that all had agreed on common methods and
\nprocedures. The difference was lay apparently only in the
\ntime that the documents were signed. The Finnish team did not
\nwant to sign solely on the basis of the autopsy, but wanted
\nfirst to perform a comprehensive evaluation of the data at
\nthe Pathological Medicine section of the Helsinki University
\nbefore signing.<\/p>\n
The reports of the autopsies of the 40 bodies from Racak per-
\nformed by the Yugoslav\/Belarus pathologists and those done by
\nthe Finnish pathologists show do not contradict one another.
\n(Both autopsy reports are at our disposal.)<\/p>\n
The following is a summary of the autopsy reports:<\/p>\n
*\u00a0 The corpses show essentially no wounds other than gunshot
\nwounds (some light scratches and bruises etc. – only one
\nelderly male showed traces of a violent blow to the face
\nwith a blunt instrument)<\/p>\n
*\u00a0 3 corpses had been postmortem bitten by animals (head and
\nneck)<\/p>\n
*\u00a0 Gunshot wounds was the cause of death in all cases<\/p>\n
*\u00a0 Both teams conclude: there is no evidence of wounds cau-
\nsed at contact discharge or close-range firing (only one
\ncorpse showed the possibility that one of two gunshot
\nwounds could have been inflicted at a relatively close
\ndistance)<\/p>\n
*\u00a0 In the reports of the Finnish team is repeated for each
\ncase: “Based on the verified autopsy of (classification
\nnumber), the categorization of manner of death, as recom-
\nmended by the World Health Organisation, could not be de-
\ntermined. On the basis of external findings, the appli-
\ncable alternatives are criminal homicide, war, or in-
\nconclusive.”<\/p>\n
*\u00a0 None of the finds showed evidence of an execution.<\/p>\n
Strikingly the reports made no mention of results of examina-
\ntions for traces of powder on the hands of the corpses. This
\nwould have furnished essential evidence about whether the
\nvictims were unarmed civilians, as The Hague indictment
\nclaims, or KLA guerrillas, whether it was an execution or
\nbattlefield deaths. To such a question posed by a journalist
\nof the “Berliner Zeitung” (March 24, 2000), Helena Ranta re-
\nsponded that the Finnish team had not even examined the hands
\nfor traces of powder.<\/p>\n
The KVM Report refers repeatedly to the decisive event that
\ndetermined the attitude of the “international community”, but
\nunlike William Walker, the report admits that the event in
\nRacak remains a mystery. Five months following NATO’s de-
\nstruction of Yugoslavia, the “Berliner Zeitung” explains un-
\nder the headlines: OSCE will reopen the case of Racak; Euro-
\npean Union report about the tragedy remains secret
\n(15.1.2000):<\/p>\n
“The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
\n(OSCE) will again concern itself with the case of the
\ncorpses found in the Kosovo village of Racak in January
\n1999. This was announced in Vienna by the new OSCE Chairman,
\nAustria’s Foreign Minister, Wolfgang Sch\u00fcssel, in answer to
\na question posed by Willy Wimmer, Vice President of the OSCE
\nParliamentary Assembly. Wimmer raised the question before
\nthe Assembly’s Standing Committee, where he referred to
\nmedia reports concerning the Finnish Pathologist, Helena
\nRanta’s return to Racak for new investigations, months fol-
\nlowing her having submitted her findings – still held secret
\n– to the European Union. In view of the significance the
\nfinding of the corpses in Racak had for the developments
\nleading up to the Kosovo War, stressed Wimmer the necessity
\nfor comprehensive clarity in the affair. Sch\u00fcssel promised
\nto “examine the case.”<\/p>\n
The exact text of the final report, terminated in March 1999, has
\nyet to be rendered public. The Foreign Ministry of Germany, having
\nplaced this report – made under the auspices of the European Union
\n– within the confines of the German Archive Law and is holding it
\nsecret even from the other member states of the European Union.<\/p>\n
OSCE Mission: A House Divided<\/p>\n
As with the other Yugoslav civil wars, also the civil war in Ser-
\nbia was seen by the US government as an opportunity for insuring
\nfurther, its uncontested hegemony over its European allies through
\nthe further extension of the power, prerogative and presence of
\nNATO under its leadership to also this region of Europe. The
\n“Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” (Dec. 12, 1998) wrote in its re-
\nport on the OSCE summit meeting in Oslo (Dec. 1998), “that some of
\nthe delegations suppose that NATO and the USA, they wouldn’t put
\nit past them, only wanted to let the OSCE get engaged as ombudsman
\nin the Kosovo conflict, to set a trap: If also the OSCE, after al-
\nready the UN has failed to measure up to Milosevic, is not up to
\nthe task and fails, NATO can be left to pose as the last bulwark
\nand the primadona. Such conspiracy theories nevertheless do have
\ngrounds, the unarmed OSCE observers on the ground will hardly be
\nable to develop authority without NATO Operation Eagle-eye aerial
\nsurveillance.”<\/p>\n
“At this time the media in the USA was applying pressure for mili-
\ntary intervention in Kosovo” wrote Heinz Loquai (ret. Br.Gen. of
\nthe German armed forces and assistant to the German representation
\nto the OSCE in Vienna) in the “Bl\u00e4ttern f\u00fcr deutsche und interna-
\ntionale Politik”, (Sept. 99). “The USA evidently also wanted to
\nestablish a precedence for NATO’s military engagement outside of a
\nUN mandate. But not all European allies, at the time were in ac-
\ncord. Particularly France was blocking. Also in Germany there were
\ndoubts. Besides, in Bonn a change of government was in the ma-
\nking.”<\/p>\n
With the accord reached between Richard Holbrooke and Slobodan Mi-
\nlosevic, October 13, 1998, under threat of a NATO aggression, the
\nUS moved a step closer to its goal of direct NATO warfare against
\nSerbia. During his negotiations in Belgrade, Holbrooke insisted
\nthat NATO, augment the military pressure on Yugoslavia by threate-
\nning intervention. Heinz Loquai explains further:<\/p>\n
Already Sept. 24, 1998 NATO unambiguously threatened the
\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia with bombing attacks. Oct.
\n13, 1998 – the same day that the Holbrooke\/Milosevic-Agree-
\nment was reached – the NATO Council authorized the Secretary
\nGeneral of the Alliance to give the go ahead for “bombing
\nattacks” against Yugoslavia – in other words, to begin the
\nwar. This unmistakable threat of war, according to
\nparticipants in the negotiations in Belgrade, was what made
\nthe Yugoslav leadership to yield. (…) During the ne-
\ngotiations the Yugoslav side repeatedly demanded the annul-
\nment of NATO’s war threat. The threat remained intact.<\/p>\n
Milosevic accepted a strong OSCE presence in Kosovo, which
\nhe before had always even in weaker proportions linked to
\npreconditions. The verifiers were assured full and unhinde-
\nred freedom of movement. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
\naccepted responsibility for their security. She committed
\nherself to supporting the OSCE mission administratively in
\nits carrying out of its duties, to establish liaison posts
\nto the mission and to cooperate. Army and police must inform
\nthe OSCE of troop movements. The armed forces and the
\nspecial police were to be reduced to a predetermined level.
\nThis was concretized in a special accord Oct. 25, 1998.”<\/p>\n
Yugoslavia was forced to accept responsibility for maintaining the
\npeace and security in this region of Yugoslavia, while “agreeing”
\nto limiting its possibilities to do so, and thereby “accepting” to
\nleave the opposing partner in this civil war, a free hand to pro-
\nfit from all limitations imposed. It must be noted that the accord
\nwas made only between Yugoslavia and the US, the NATO and the
\nOSCE. (The KLA was not only not a party to any of the accords nor
\nwas the KLA even mentioned in the accords. The accords had no bin-
\nding effect on the KLA. This means that Yugoslavia was even held
\naccountable for the consequences of KLA behavior.)
\nSuch accords could not bring peace and stabilization to the re-
\ngion. The fact is, they created optimal conditions for the KLA to
\ncontinue its war against Serbia and its peoples. Racak must be un-
\nderstood in this context.<\/p>\n
Just a few weeks before the Holbrook-Milosevic Accord, “The KLA
\nappeared to have been completely eliminated as a result of the
\nSerbian summer offensive of 1998. Only to reappear like a phoenix
\nfrom the ashes, reorganized, with newer weapons and determined “to
\ndraw NATO into its fight for independence by provoking Serb forces
\ninto further atrocities” as a U.S. intelligence report frankly put
\nit. “More and more often KLA terrorists were seen in new German
\ncamouflage uniforms – even bearing the black-red-gold emblem of
\nthe German flag.” (Matthias K\u00fcntzel, Der Weg in den Krieg, pg.
\n155)<\/p>\n
The principal deputy Head of Mission of the KVM, the French diplo-
\nmat, Gabriel Keller explains:<\/p>\n
The KLA never really tried, as a whole, to participate in
\nthe improvement of the situation on the ground. Every pull-
\nback by the Yugoslav army or the Serbian police was followed
\nby a movement forward by its force, which the other side of
\ncourse considered as a violation of the cease-fire (or at
\nlease a violation of the commitment to restrain, for the KLA
\ndid not sign a cease-fire). OSCE’s presence compelled the
\nstate forces to a certain restraint, at least at the
\nbeginning of our mission, and KLA took advantage of this to
\nconsolidate its positions everywhere, continuing smuggling
\narms from Albania, abducting and killing people both
\ncivilians and militaries, Albanians and Serbs as well.
\n(Keller Gabriel The OSCE\/KVM: Autopsy of a Mission; Sta-
\ntement delivered by Amb. Gabriel Keller, principal deputy
\nhead of mission to the watch group on May 25th)<\/p>\n
William Walker, having been picked by Madeleine Albright to head
\nthe OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), proved not the the
\nperson to successfully handle such a delicate non-partisan job.
\nThe German daily, “Die Welt” (Jan. 20, 1999) described William
\nWalker and his mission:<\/p>\n
The 63 year old Walker until now had mostly been engaged in
\nMiddle and Latin America to defend US interests. What has
\nmade his name an evil omen for Belgrade is his deployment in
\nPanama.<\/p>\n
Walker had hardly arrived in Kosovo, when the Serbian lea-
\ndership began to complain that the entire OSCE mission was
\nonly there for the purpose of fabricating excuses for a NATO
\nmilitary intervention. The mission and Walker were accused
\nof systematically overstepping the bounds of their mandate.<\/p>\n
This was true. Under Walker’s leadership the OSCE mission
\nwas experiencing what the Americans since the UN deployment
\nin Bosnia call “mission creep” – the slow, steadily creeping
\nchange in the mandated profile of the mission. At first the
\nOSCE monitors were supposed to only be observing and
\nascertaining if the cease-fire reached Oct. 12 is being
\nrespected, or who is responsible for its violation.
\nThe monitors also did that. But they did much more. Repea-
\ntedly they transported wounded from both sides out of the
\nbattle zone and mediated occasionally between Albanians and
\nSerbs to attain a return to the cease-fire. Following the
\nattacks of Serbian security forces since Sunday on the vil-
\nlage of Racak, the OSCE observers have been successfully
\nescorting refugees through Serbian police roadblocks.<\/p>\n
Racak has also become a symbol for the powerlessness of the
\nOSCE. And also for an almost cowardly behavior, that Wal-
\nker’s more aggressive interpretation of the mission coun-
\ntered. First, after observers determined that a massacre had
\nbeen committed on more than 40 Albanians, Walker said
\npublicly that this is a war crime committed by Serbian se-
\ncurity forces, for which Yugoslavia’s head of state, Slobo-
\ndan Milosevic could personally be held accountable.<\/p>\n
This statement confirmed the fears of the Serbs: Walker was
\nseeking grounds for a military intervention. The government
\ndeclared him persona non grata. (Boris Kalnoky, “Die Welt”
\n20.1.99)<\/p>\n
With military-like hierarchical structures the KVM was tailored to
\ngiving the Walker, the American “Head of Mission” (HOM) and his
\nclosest deputies, the maximum of control over the mission. Wal-
\nker’s deputy, Gabriel Keller, made the following critical observa-
\ntions of the mission under Walkers leadership:<\/p>\n
“The political dimension of the mission was too small. (…)
\nSome of the mission members chose from the beginning to
\nadopt a very aggressive behavior with the official
\n[Yugoslav] authorities. The potential benefits of diplomacy
\nwere thus deliberately sacrificed. (…) We never tried, at
\nthe upper level of the mission, to associate the Yugoslavs
\nto our work. In the Regional Committees, such a work was
\ndone, sometimes very successfully, which proves it was not
\nan impossible challenge. A growing number of mission mem-
\nbers, nationals of OSCE countries not belonging to NATO, who
\ndid not approve this behavior, felt more and more un-
\ncomfortable in a mission which did not reflect the sensiti-
\nvity of their countries. (…)<\/p>\n
The even-handedness of the mission was questioned from the
\nvery beginning. We never managed to clear this impression.
\n(…) After some weeks of our presence, the global image of
\nOSCE\/KVM was to be anti-Serb, pro-Albanian and pro-NATO. It
\nwas easy, when we drove through different parts of the
\ncountry, to guess by whom it was populated: in Serbian
\nareas, bad gestures and sometimes stones (…), in Albanian
\nareas, applauds, smiles and signs of victory. Nothing was
\ndone to correct this image.<\/p>\n
I would distinguish two periods in the mission’s life: be-
\nfore Racak and after Racak. Before the 15th January, every-
\nthing still seemed possible. Although difficult, some dia-
\nlogue was possible with the Serbs, the level of violence in
\nthe field was acceptable. (…) After Racak and the disa-
\nstrous decision from the Yugoslav authorities to declare
\n[Walker] persona non grata, the mission faced crisis after
\ncrisis. The already low level of confidence with the autho-
\nrities came down to zero. Our verifiers came more frequently
\nunder threats from MUP and VJ. Access to wider zones were
\nrestricted. More unjustified troop movements were observed.
\nOn the other side, the level of aggressiveness by KLA
\nremained high: abduction of policemen, mine laying, murders
\nof civilians were more frequent after January 15th.<\/p>\n
General Loquai explains further:<\/p>\n
The developments show that the possibility of finding a pe-
\naceful solution to the Kosovo conflict was existent. The
\nchance was within reach in the period from mid-October to
\nthe beginning of December 1998. During these weeks the Fe-
\nderal Republic of Yugoslavia was embarked on a peace course.
\nThe doves had evidently won the upper hand. It would have
\nbeen necessary to have brought – or forced – the Kosovo
\nAlbanians also over to this course. A swift stationing of
\nthe OSCE mission all over the area would have been able to
\nsecure the route to peace. Neither was accomplished.<\/p>\n
Evidently Walker did not intend to give “a peaceful solution” a
\nchance.<\/p>\n
Walker and other American members of the mission had been under
\nsuspicion of sabotaging the functioning of the mission to prepare
\na justification for NATO to go to war. Recently it has been con-
\nfirmed that there was a whole team of American intelligence agents
\nat work – against the OSCE and peace. The Sunday Times (London
\nMarch 12, 2000) provided the following information:<\/p>\n
“AMERICAN intelligence agents have admitted they helped to
\ntrain the Kosovo Liberation Army before NATO’s bombing of
\nYugoslavia. The disclosure angered some European diplomats,
\nwho said this had undermined moves for a political solution
\nto the conflict between Serbs and Albanians.<\/p>\n
Central Intelligence Agency officers were cease-fire moni-
\ntors in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, developing ties with the
\nKLA and giving American military training manuals and field
\nadvice on fighting the Yugoslav army and Serbian police.<\/p>\n
When the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Eu-
\nrope (OSCE), which coordinated the monitoring, left Kosovo a
\nweek before air strikes began a year ago, many of its sa-
\ntellite telephones and global positioning systems were se-
\ncretly handed to the KLA, ensuring that guerrilla commanders
\ncould stay in touch with NATO and Washington. Several KLA
\nleaders had the mobile phone number of General Wesley Clark,
\nthe NATO commander.<\/p>\n
European diplomats then working for the OSCE claim it was
\nbetrayed by an American policy that made air strikes inevi-
\ntable. Some have questioned the motives and loyalties of
\nWilliam Walker, the American OSCE head of mission.<\/p>\n
“The American agenda consisted of their diplomatic obser-
\nvers, aka the CIA, operating on completely different terms
\nto the rest of Europe and the OSCE,” said a European envoy.
\n(…)
\nWalker, who was nominated by Madeleine Albright, the Ameri-
\ncan secretary of state, was intensely disliked by Belgrade.
\nHe had worked briefly for the United Nations in Croatia. Ten
\nyears earlier he was the American ambassador to El Salvador
\nwhen Washington was helping the government there to suppress
\nleftist rebels while supporting the contra guerrillas
\nagainst the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.<\/p>\n
Some European diplomats in Pristina, Kosovo’s capital,
\nconcluded from Walker’s background that he was inextricably
\nlinked with the CIA. The picture was muddied by the conti-
\nnued separation of American “diplomatic observers” from the
\nmission. The CIA sources who have now broken their silence
\nsay the diplomatic observers were more closely connected to
\nthe agency.<\/p>\n
“It was a CIA front, gathering intelligence on the KLA’s
\narms and leadership,” said one. (…)<\/p>\n
The KLA has admitted its long-standing links with American
\nand European intelligence organizations. Shaban Shala, a KLA
\ncommander now involved in attempts to destabilise majority
\nAlbanian villages beyond Kosovo’s border in Serbia proper,
\nclaimed he had met British, American and Swiss agents in
\nnorthern Albania in 1996.”<\/p>\n
Overcoming hesitations in Washington:<\/p>\n
In the Clinton Administration, it was Madeleine Albright, who cru-
\nsaded for war against Yugoslavia, and finally won. Preceding the
\nRacak incident, the recognized US government policy had been for-
\nmulated in the classified strategy paper, known as the Status Quo
\nPlus proposal:<\/p>\n
“promote regional stability and protect our investment in
\nBosnia; prevent resumption of hostilities in Kosovo and re-
\nnewed humanitarian crisis; preserve U.S. and NATO credibi-
\nlity,”<\/p>\n
Racak changed that. With Racak, the policy of attempting to
\n“promote regional stability” was replaced with a promotion of re-
\ngional chaos through support for ethnic warfare. The “Washington
\nPost” (18.4.1999), sheds light on developments leading up to this
\nchange of policy in the US administration:<\/p>\n
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright was pressing — and
\nlosing, for the moment — a campaign to scale up U.S. and
\nNATO intervention in Kosovo. (…) Albright said muddling
\nthrough was not working, and the time had come to tie the
\nthreat of force to a comprehensive settlement between
\nSerbia, the dominant Yugoslav republic, and Kosovo, its se-
\ncessionist province. (…) Albright, who used her seat at
\nthe Cabinet table as U.N. ambassador to press unsuccessfully
\nduring Clinton’s first term for earlier intervention in
\nBosnia, saw Kosovo as a chance to right historical wrongs.
\n(…) By the first days of March 1998, the secretary of
\nstate had begun a conscious effort, as one aide put it, “to
\nlead through rhetoric.” Her targets were European allies,
\nU.S. public opinion and her own government. (…)
\nIn Washington, a defense policy official said Albright’s
\n[threats against Serbia made in talks with West European
\nallies] reverberated with some anxiety in the Pentagon.
\n“Let’s not get too far ahead of ourselves in terms of making
\nthreats,” he said of the atmosphere. Berger, at the White
\nHouse, was described by colleagues as worried about damaging
\nU.S. credibility by appearing to promise more in Kosovo than
\nthe president was prepared to deliver. (…)<\/p>\n
But the period between [June – September 1998] saw a furious
\ninternal debate [in NATO] on whether the alliance could act
\nmilitarily without explicit authority from the Security
\nCouncil. On Sept. 24, a day after a carefully ambiguous
\nSecurity Council resolution, Washington finally persuaded
\nits allies to issue an ultimatum to Milosevic to pull back.
\nOct. 13 brought the first “activation order” in NATO’s
\nhistory, a formal agreement to authorize the bombing of
\nYugoslavia. (…) Warnings to the rebel leaders from
\nWashington restrained them somewhat, but they assassinated a
\nsmall-town Serb mayor near Pristina and were believed re-
\nsponsible for the slaying of six Serb youths at the Panda
\nCafe in Pec on Dec. 14. (…) One U.S. official said, “one
\nof our difficulties, particularly with the Europeans . . .
\nwas getting them to accept the proposition that the root of
\nthe problem is Belgrade.” (Barton Gellman, “Washington Post”
\n18.4.1999)<\/p>\n
To “draw NATO into its fight for independence” the KLA, like its
\nBosnian and Croatian predecessors, uses the famous atrocity provo-
\ncation scenario. Racak is but the last of a series leading up to
\nthe war.<\/p>\n
According to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (March 28, 2000)
\nWestern diplomats confided to the KLA, that for less than 5,000
\ncivilian casualties, there would be no western presence in Kosovo.
\n“Promptly the Albanians intensified their attacks against the Ser-
\nbian police, to get them to retaliate against civilians. Simulta-
\nneously they put pictures of massacres in the internet and sent
\nchildren before the cameras to tell stories about [war] crimes”.<\/p>\n
Gen. Loquai notes a change in developments:<\/p>\n
Beginning in December (1998) the armed altercations became
\nmore often. The Yugoslavian side called repeatedly for a
\nswifter stationing of the OSCE verifiers, accusing the in-
\nternational community of working hand in hand with “Albanian
\nterrorists”. The Albanian leaders continued to proclaim that
\ntheir objective was the independence of Kosovo and to call
\nfor the military intervention of NATO. Better commanded and
\narmed, they intensified their struggle with a “hit and run”
\ntactic. The Serbs struck back – often disproportionately
\nhard and went over onto the offensive. The October accords
\nwere being respected less and less from both sides.<\/p>\n
Yugoslavia, frustrated with the attitude of the OSCE mission, be-
\ngan to reinforce the troops on the ground – in violation of the
\naccords. The “Washington Post” (Apr. 18, 1999) reported that Clin-
\nton’s advisors saw no possibility of using this fact to mobilize
\nthe allies. “You’re not going to get people to bomb over the spe-
\ncific number of troops.”<\/p>\n
The mood for bombing had to be created. The New York Times (Jan.
\n19, 1999) exposes clairvoyant capacities of Mme. Albright:<\/p>\n
According to an Administration official Secretary of State
\nMadeleine K. Albright warned on Friday, a day before the
\nmassacre [in Racak] became public, that the fragile Kosovo
\nagreement brokered last fall by an American envoy, Richard
\nC. Holbrooke, was about to fall apart. Ms. Albright told the
\nWhite House, the Pentagon and other agencies that the
\nAdministration faced a “decision point” in Kosovo, the of-
\nficial said. (…) She told others in the Administration
\nthat Mr. Milosevic needed to realize that he faced a real
\npotential for NATO action, if he did not get that message,
\nhe would not make any concessions, she argued.<\/p>\n
The “Washington Post” explains that Ms. Albright realized that the
\ngalvanizing force of the atrocity would not last long. “Whatever
\nthreat of force you don’t get in the next two weeks you’re never
\ngetting,” one adviser told her, “at least until the next Racak.”<\/p>\n
Madeleine Albright got what she wanted. The consequences will be
\nfelt for generations to come.<\/p>\n
The scepticism concerning the “massacre” version became irrelevant
\nin the rapidly changing events leading to a war, long since plan-
\nned and prepared. Even though it should have been clear that Racak
\nwas needed to justify this aggression, there was no one on the po-
\nlitical level willing to publicly demand a closer investigation.
\nThe Walker\/KLA version was allowed to predominate. This version
\nprepared the next stage: the Rambouillet ultimatum.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
The press conference given by Helena Ranta, the eminent Finnish forensic scientist asked to provide an independent forensic assessment of the alleged Racak Massacre, was extraordinary. \u00a0The date of the conference had been postponed several times. \u00a0When it finally took place, the start was delayed by some three hours while further discussions took place backstage. … <\/p>\n
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