Transcript of Lecture given by Professor Lord Robert Skidelsky\u00a0<\/i>at Royal Institute of Civil Engineers Monday 14th June 1999<\/i><\/p>\n
Now that NATO’s air war in Serbia has been successfully concluded, this\u00a0is a good moment to step back from the headlines and attempt an interim\u00a0reckoning.<\/p>\n
In my experience, the fiercest disagreements on the war have concerned\u00a0two questions: first, the scale of the humanitarian tragedy unfolding in\u00a0Kosovo before the war started and which the war was designed to stop or\u00a0prevent, and secondly, the effects of the war on international relations.<\/p>\n
I will address both of these issues in my speech this evening. We have\u00a0to remember, though, that this is an interim assessment. Many of the facts\u00a0are not to hand. Some of them are still locked up in Serbia. And most of\u00a0the history which this war will produce has not yet happened.<\/p>\n
So we have to draw on our own historical experience and imagination to\u00a0make sense of this tragic story.<\/p>\n
My story starts with some general reflections suggested by history,\u00a0before zooming in on the particulars of the tragedy itself.<\/p>\n
One of the oldest divides in politics is between the Moralists and the\u00a0Prudentialists. Moralists have a passion to make the crooked path of\u00a0humanity straight; prudentialists to make the best of an inherently\u00a0imperfect world. I know that prudence is itself a moral virtue, and\u00a0moralists are also capable of discarding the sandals of the preacher\u00a0for the clogs of the politician. But the basic divide goes back at least to\u00a0biblical times. The New Testament calls the two sides the ‘children of\u00a0light’ and the ‘children of this world’.<\/p>\n
In international relations the divide cuts especially deep, because\u00a0conflicts of interest and values run much deeper and have a more lethal\u00a0potential, so that peace is both more valuable and more fragile. This\u00a0is why, over centuries of conflict, we have learnt to prize the prudential\u00a0tradition of statesmanship.<\/p>\n
Both Moralists and Prudentialists indulge in dreams of a single world.<\/p>\n
Moralists often think of this in terms of a new world order, united by\u00a0a common set of principles or ‘norms’. The Wilsonian doctrine of national\u00a0self-determination as a universal solvent of the world’s ills falls\u00a0into this camp. Prudentialists more typically think of the world growing\u00a0together through the spread of commerce, the movement of peoples, the\u00a0gradual encroachment of ideas. The moralist perspective leads naturally\u00a0to world government; Prudentialists think more naturally of a global\u00a0extension of the Congress system developed to keep the European peace in the 19th\u00a0century. Prudentialists are strongly suspicious of Utopian projects,\u00a0and in this they have biblical support. As Jesus Christ said: ‘The children of\u00a0this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light.’<\/p>\n
This division of outlook helps explain why it is possible to have two\u00a0views of NATO’s war in Yugoslavia. This goes far beyond arguments about\u00a0military strategy, about who started ‘ethnic cleansing’, or comparisons of\u00a0atrocities. It is about what policies make for a tolerable world. As\u00a0you may have gathered, I am a prudentialist. This does not mean I have any\u00a0partiality for Milosevic; nor that I would not have striven to improve\u00a0a dreadful situation. It does mean that I believe that the Balkans, andthe world as a whole, would be better off if this war had never taken\u00a0place.<\/p>\n
At this moment, the moralists are in the ascendant. NATO’s resolve has\u00a0been vindicated; Milosevic has capitulated. Would-be tyrants have been shown\u00a0that crime does not pay. Even the military critics are on the defensive.\u00a0Contrary to what they said, air power works!<\/p>\n
But look again: Kosovo has been ‘cleansed’ of 850,000 extra Albanian\u00a0Kosovars since the start of a war intended to prevent a humanitarian\u00a0disaster. They will have to be returned to a devastated territory or\u00a0resettled elsewhere. The bills for military occupation and\u00a0reconstruction will be vast. All this is on the assumption that the Belgrade Agreement\u00a0will go ahead as planned.<\/p>\n
Then consider the effects of the war on international relations. I\u00a0cannot put it better than Mark Almond: ‘NATO’s military action has radically\u00a0changed the rules of the international game. In fact, they were torn up\u00a0when Nato’s cruise missiles and bombers went into action without UN\u00a0Security Council approval.’1<\/p>\n
The preliminary reactions of Russia and China, both symbolic and\u00a0serious, are evidence of this. Russia has been slighted and alienated, the\u00a0domestic position of its Westernisers greatly weakened.\u00a0China abstained in the crucial Security Council resolution authorising\u00a0the entry of NATO peacekeepers into Kosovo and has said it will withdraw\u00a0from further nuclear disarmament talks.<\/p>\n
India has said it will press ahead with a new submarine-based missile\u00a0system.<\/p>\n
The Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohammed, has suggested that\u00a0non-Western nations may have to secede from the various declarations of\u00a0human rights they have signed up to. There is talk of new strategic\u00a0doctrines, of anti-NATO alliances.<\/p>\n
No doubt much of this is hot air. At present no one is in a position to\u00a0challenge the new Pax Americana. But there is much too much destructive\u00a0weaponry lying around to make an imposed peace stable. Global\u00a0rearmament, the break-up of the still-fragile global economy, a weakening of the\u00a0claims of international law – these are not implausible repercussions of the\u00a0bombing. If NATO’s action turns out to have worsened international\u00a0relations without achieving its peace aims in Kosovo, its ‘victory’\u00a0will be doubly Pyrrhic.<\/p>\n
In my debate on Kosovo with Michael Ignatieff in the June issue of\u00a0Prospect, I argued that the war would make the world a more dangerous\u00a0place. I took my stand on the old principle of non-interference in the\u00a0internal affairs of sovereign states, codified in the UN Charter, as\u00a0against the ‘new doctrine of the international community’ proclaimed by\u00a0the Prime Minister in his speech in Chicago on 22 April. So far, this\u00a0‘doctrine’ is the only attempt I know to justify, in terms of\u00a0fundamental principle, what NATO is doing in Yugoslavia; I want to unpick it\u00a0tonight.<\/p>\n
At its heart is the assertion that globalisation has made the old\u00a0doctrine of non-interference obsolete.<\/p>\n
‘Globalisation’ says the Prime Minister ‘is not just economic. It is\u00a0also a political and security phenomenon. We live in a world where\u00a0isolationism has ceased to have a reason to exist…We are all internationalists\u00a0now. We cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights in\u00a0other countries if we still want to be secure’.<\/p>\n
The New Doctrine, Mr. Blair said, requires an ‘important qualification’\u00a0to the principle of ‘non-interference in the internal affairs of other\u00a0countries’. Implicitly recognising that the NATO action would not have\u00a0gained Security Council authorization, Mr. Blair says ‘we must find a\u00a0new way to make the UN and its Security Council work’.<\/p>\n
He also implicitly endorsed the notion of establishing protectorates in\u00a0countries incapable of civilised self-government: ‘we cannot simply\u00a0walk away once the fight is over, better to stay with moderate number of\u00a0troops than return for repeat performances’. To the historically minded, the\u00a0New Doctrine bears an uncanny resemblance to the Old Doctrine of ethical\u00a0imperialism, in whose name ‘civilised’ countries imposed their ‘values’\u00a0on ‘barbarous’ ones.<\/p>\n
Mr. Blair insists that the New Doctrine is based on ‘values’ not on\u00a0‘territorial ambitions’. But values and interests, he adds, cannot be\u00a0separated. ‘If we can establish and spread the values of liberty, the\u00a0rule of law, human rights and an open society then that is in our national\u00a0interests too. The spread of our values makes us safer’.<\/p>\n
The New Doctrine apparently gives an unlimited right of sanctioning\u00a0‘barbarous acts’. But military intervention must be qualified by a\u00a0number of moral and prudential considerations. Mr. Blair lists five: ‘Are we\u00a0sure of our case?’ ‘Have we exhausted all diplomatic options?’ ‘Are there\u00a0military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake?’ ‘Are we\u00a0prepared for the long term?’ and ‘Do we have national interests\u00a0involved?’ Presumably, his answer in the Yugoslav case is ‘yes’ to all five.<\/p>\n
Before I take up these five points, let me say a few words about the\u00a0principles which underly them.<\/p>\n
My main disagreement with the New Doctrine is that it assumes a world\u00a0which does not exist. It may be the world we would like to exist, and which\u00a0will come to exist, given time. But right now the ‘international community’\u00a0is merely a project – a Western or American project. This gap between what\u00a0we want to happen and what can be made to happen runs right through NATO’s\u00a0interventions in the wars of the Yugoslav succession – through its\u00a0diplomatic initiatives, its military strategy, its peace aims, and its\u00a0appreciation of outcomes. At all stages there has been a strong element\u00a0of wish fulfilment.<\/p>\n
The central problem lies in that ensnaring word ‘globalization’. To Mr.\u00a0Blair, as to most of us, it means deepening economic integration across\u00a0countries. This is undoubtedly happening. But economic nationalism is\u00a0not dead, and needs only modest political excuses to spring to life. As Mr.\u00a0Blair himself acknowledges ‘Recent trade disputes have been a bad\u00a0omen.’ Nevertheless, he assumes that globalisation is an irreversible fact,\u00a0which requires a ‘new doctrine of international community’ based on the\u00a0‘explicit recognition’ of mutual dependence.<\/p>\n
Mr. Blair’s bold assertion, as I interpret it, is that globalization\u00a0must be capped by a new ethical framework based on universal human rights.<\/p>\n
Now it is certainly true that global markets require, and tend to\u00a0produce, a uniform regulatory framework: the World Trade Organisation is a\u00a0conspicuous example. Reduction of economic risk may also favour some\u00a0types of political and fiscal constitution over others, though I am less\u00a0persuaded of this. But in other areas, it is not only not true, but\u00a0counter-productively untrue. If the price of globalization is a\u00a0visitation from the United States air force, this is a price many states in the\u00a0world will not pay.<\/p>\n
We must always remember that states remain the main actors in\u00a0international relations. Globalisation takes place with the permission of\u00a0governments, because it offers their peoples the benefits of prosperity and peace.<\/p>\n
They are quite capable of putting it into reverse, if they come to doubt\u00a0these benefits, or if they think globalization is simply a mask for Western\u00a0imperialism. It happened once before, in 1914.<\/p>\n
The continuing role of states reflects the fact that governments remain\u00a0guardians of the particular interests and moral traditions of electorates\u00a0to whom they are accountable, rightly so. Globalisation does not mean\u00a0that something called the ‘international community’ has replaced national\u00a0communities as objects of loyalty and sources of values. ‘Globalisation’\u00a0may be creating a weak sense of universal citizenship, especially among\u00a0the elites. But it is also accompanied by a tendency for multi-national\u00a0states to break up into their national\/religious components. Peoples are\u00a0becoming more globalist in their economic lives, more particularist in their\u00a0cultural lives, the second probably in reaction to the first. How these\u00a0two contrary pulls are negotiated will determine whether the 21st century\u00a0is pacific or warlike.<\/p>\n
It follows that the ‘international community’ cannot be the sole\u00a0generator of ethical values. Western society is individualist; Asian society\u00a0believes in the subordination of the individual to the group. The second is not\u00a0destined to progress naturally to the first. Nor has the age-old\u00a0conflict between universalist norms and what Eugene Kamenka called ‘the mundane\u00a0municipal order in which we live’ been settled by globalization. In\u00a0today’s world it is liable to erupt precisely in the context of racial and\u00a0religious strife such as we have seen in Yugoslavia, where individual\u00a0rights have come into conflict with group rights, and group rights with\u00a0state rights.<\/p>\n
Mary Kaldor argues that the nature of war has changed. The old wars\u00a0were about the defence of borders. The new wars are about identity politics,\u00a0they spill across frontiers, they break down the distinction between\u00a0soldiers and civilians, they are linked to poverty, trade in arms and\u00a0drugs, and they are amplified enormously by global media.2\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Much of this is true and important. But states and frontiers remain important. The Gulf\u00a0War of 1991 was traditional in everything except its high technology.<\/p>\n And if the new type of war order needs a new type of police force to\u00a0control, let it be properly international and properly instituted.<\/p>\n This brings me to my next point. Insofar as an “international\u00a0community” can be said to exist, it is clearly not synonymous with NATO. (Nor, for\u00a0that matter, is NATO synonymous with the USA and Britain.) The attempt\u00a0to convert a defensive alliance to protect Western Europe into an agent of\u00a0ethical imperialism is fraught with danger. The New Doctrine\u00a0unashamedly identifies the good of the world with Anglo-American ‘values’. With\u00a0this goes a ‘new strategic concept, which apparently allows [NATO] to\u00a0supplant the UN Security Council and embrace the whole planet in its zone of\u00a0responsibility’.3 Again, it has to be stressed that there is no world\u00a0government responsible for enforcing human rights, nor does NATO have\u00a0any general mandate to act as world policeman. What we have in the UN\u00a0Charter is a code of prudential rules designed to maximise the chances of\u00a0peaceful co-existence – no more and no less.<\/p>\n Finally, is it really true, as Mr. Blair asserts that ‘values and\u00a0interests merge’, that ‘the spread of our values makes us safer’? Yes, Europe may\u00a0be said to have an interest in stopping ‘ethnic cleansing’ on its\u00a0doorstep. But why is this an interest of the United States? The fact that the\u00a0United States was only weakly interested in Kosovo dictated and besmirched the\u00a0whole character of the war. Generally speaking, it is obviously true\u00a0that the spread of our values makes us safer – if they spread naturally\u00a0through the influence of commerce, education, and voluntary imitation. But it\u00a0is the reverse of the truth if we try to force them on others. It makes the\u00a0world a more dangerous place, because it breeds resentments and\u00a0hatreds, out of which new wars grow.<\/p>\n The idea that all that menaces the unity of mankind is a few rogue\u00a0leaders who have to be swatted like flies is a dangerously childish perspective\u00a0on post-Communist reality.<\/p>\n We come back to my central point. If we allow globalisation to spill\u00a0over naturally into politics and ethics we have the makings of a peaceful\u00a0and prosperous world. If we try to force our values on others we risk a\u00a0different kind of spill-over – into reactive nationalism, political as\u00a0well as economic, which damages both peace and prosperity.<\/p>\n This brings me to Mr. Blair’s five tests for military intervention inYugoslavia.<\/p>\n First, he asks, ‘Are we sure of our case?’ To start with, this is a\u00a0legal question. The rule of law is at the heart of the Western political\u00a0tradition, and the West has pioneered its extension into international\u00a0relations. The UN Charter spells out international law as it has been\u00a0accepted, understood, and usually acted on, since the Second World War.<\/p>\n It is governed by the two principles of non-interference in the domestic\u00a0affairs of sovereign states and Great Power consensus for military\u00a0action. The the Charter is the legal codification of all we have learnt\u00a0about international relations since the Thirty Years War, which ended with\u00a0the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.<\/p>\n International law is not static. With the ‘end of ideology’, three\u00a0kinds of tension in the United Nations system have come to the surface: between\u00a0territorial unity and national self-determination, between\u00a0non-interference and human rights, and between the non-use of force and humanitarian\u00a0action. All three have been at issue in Kosovo; in Marc Weller’s words, Kosovo\u00a0crystallises a struggle over the ‘core values of the international\u00a0system’.4 Struggle, not consensus, is the operative word.<\/p>\n So what is the status of the NATO action in international law?<\/p>\n Except for an inherent right of self defence, all military action under\u00a0the UN Charter has to be authorised by the Security Council and is limited\u00a0to protecting members from aggression and countering threats to, or\u00a0breaches of, the peace, the Council having determined that these in fact exist.<\/p>\n Interference, military or otherwise, in the domestic affairs of member\u00a0states is excluded.5<\/p>\n Most members have also signed up to a number of declarations and\u00a0covenants of human rights. Taken together these constitute “a common standard of\u00a0achievement for all peoples and all nations”, to be realised by\u00a0education and “progressive measures”.6 No enforcement machinery is provided. The\u00a0Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide\u00a0(1948) and the Torture Convention (1988) are justiciable, in the courts of the\u00a0states in which the crime took place, or by agreement of the\u00a0signatories, in international tribunals. An International Tribunal was set up in\u00a01993 to prosecute individuals for crimes against ‘international humanitarian\u00a0law ‘committed in Yugoslavia after 1991. In the case of all human rights’\u00a0violations (including genocide) indictments are brought against\u00a0persons, not states. There is a legal basis for charging Milosevic and his\u00a0partners with crimes against humanity; none for ‘making war’ on Yugoslavia,\u00a0either to bring them to trial (which is not a NATO objective) or for bringingthe crimes to an end.<\/p>\n The UN Security Council has never authorised NATO either to threaten or\u00a0to use force to resolve the Kosovo issue. Thus it would seem that NATO’s\u00a0military’s action is inconsistent with the UN Charter. The British\u00a0government’s legal defence of the NATO action is that as ‘an\u00a0exceptional measure to halt an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe, Military\u00a0intervention is legally justifiable under international law’, when all\u00a0other possibilities have been exhausted.7 The Security Council, notably\u00a0on 24 October 1998, affirmed that the unresolved situation in Kosovo\u00a0“constitutes a continuing threat to peace and security in the region”\u00a0and expressing alarm and concern “at the continuing grave humanitarian\u00a0situation throughout Kosovo and the impending humanitarian catastrophe,\u00a0and re- emphasising the need to prevent this from happening”.8<\/p>\n The government”s legal case rested, therefore, on the urgent need to\u00a0halt ethnic cleansing, which the Security Council had decided, was a ‘threat\u00a0to the peace’. But in international law it was up to the Security Council\u00a0to determine whether the circumstances of the case justified the use of\u00a0force. It was never given the chance to do so. NATO therefore set itself up as\u00a0the sole judge of the objective and factual circumstances justifying a\u00a0military intervention. Strictly speaking, therefore the action was illegal,9 and\u00a0this was implicitly recognised by Mr. Blair when he said in Chicago\u00a0that international law would have to be changed.<\/p>\n Was there, then, a moral imperative to use force which overrode\u00a0international law? Morality is central to NATO’s justification of\u00a0military action. To make the war just, it had to be able to say that military\u00a0action was the only way to stop ethnic cleansing.<\/p>\n To determine the justice of the war, we have to try answer three\u00a0questions. Was there in fact a looming ‘humanitarian catastrophe’? Were there no\u00a0other means to avert it? And would a ‘sensible and prudent’ use of force make\u00a0the situation of the Kosovars and – I emphasise this – of international\u00a0relations more secure than it was? The second and third questions are\u00a0Mr. Blair’s own tests for waging war.<\/p>\n On the first point, as I have said, the evidence is not all in. On our\u00a0television screens we see images of suffering stripped of their history\u00a0stripped that is of the history of accusations, rumours, grievances,\u00a0dramatic incidents, atrocities which have plagued Balkan history, and\u00a0which started up again as the Cold War wound down, with much external\u00a0meddling on the way. ‘Legitimised genocide’ was a term first used by the Serbs todescribe what the Albanian Kosovars were doing to them. The ludicrous\u00a0case of the man with the broken bottle in his bottom, which sparked\u00a0off widespread riots in the mid 1980s, shows the explosive effect which\u00a0ignorance and rumour have when trust between communities is close to\u00a0zero.<\/p>\n On the one side there is the Kosovan struggle for independence which\u00a0became an armed struggle in 1997 with looting of the Albanian arsenals; on the\u00a0other the perception of the Serbs of themselves as victims, Milosevic’s\u00a0dream of a Greater Serbia, the denial by the Serbs that they were in\u00a0any way to blame for the breakup of Yugoslavia or the Kosovan tragedy or\u00a0that any Serb could commit atrocities.<\/p>\n After the breakdown of government in Albania in 1997, the Kosovan\u00a0Liberation Army acquired a large supply of arms. This enabled them to\u00a0escalate the armed struggle for independence. Serb paramilitaries –\u00a0rather like our Black and Tans in Ireland in 1920.<\/p>\n By the autumn of 1998, the UN estimated that 230,000 Albanian Kosovars\u00a0had been displaced from their homes, driven into the mountains by shelling\u00a0of their villages, out of an Albanian Kosovar population of 1.3 million.<\/p>\n This was undoubtedly a humanitarian tragedy. But suggested methods of\u00a0dealing with it were highly coloured by the Western perception, for\u00a0which I have yet to see convincing evidence and I know that horrible stories\u00a0like today’s will continue to emerge, that the genocide or mass expulsion\u00a0of the Kosovan population had by now become the deliberate aim of the\u00a0Serbian government. Our understanding of this tragedy has been shaped by the\u00a0use of slippery words like ‘genocide’ and ‘ethnic cleansing’, comparisons\u00a0between Milosevic and Hitler, Kosovo and Auschwitz. This perception demonised\u00a0the Serbs, and dictated the nature of the diplomacy which followed.<\/p>\n This brings me to Mr. Blair’s second question. Had we exhausted all\u00a0diplomatic options? Here it is important to notice that diplomatic\u00a0intervention was based on the assumption that the humanitarian disaster\u00a0to be averted was the physical liquidation and\/or the mass expulsion of\u00a0Albanian Kosovars from Serbia, rather than the human suffering which\u00a0was the byproduct of a particularly nasty civil war. Basically the Federal\u00a0Republic of Yugoslavia was ordered by the United States as leader of\u00a0NATO to end the repression of the civilian population of Kosovo on threat of\u00a0air strikes. A shadowy plan for Kosovan self-government within the\u00a0Yugoslavia also emerged from State Department briefs. So did the\u00a0fundamental contradiction between continuing to assert Yugoslav\u00a0sovereignty over Kosovo and at the same time asserting the Yugoslav government’s\u00a0unfitness to govern it. Although a formal symmetry was maintained in\u00a0demands on the KLA and FRY, responsibility for starting and ending the\u00a0fighting in Kosovo was placed on the FRY, and the military threats\u00a0directed against it. At this stage, Russia was not involved in the diplomaticeffort.<\/p>\n On 30 January of this year, following the discovery by journalists of\u00a0the bodies of 45 individuals evidently executed at close range by\u00a0Serb forces, the North Atlantic Council threatened military intervention\u00a0unless both sides attended a conference at Rambouillet. At the Rambouillet\u00a0conference, which started on February 6, both delegations were\u00a0presented with a single page of “non negotiable principles” for a political\u00a0settlement based on a self governing Kosovo within the FRY, together\u00a0with a supervised implementation procedure. During the negotiations\u00a0concessions were made to Serb\/FRY proposals aiming to give the minority ethnic\u00a0groups – that is mainly the Serbs – blocking powers in the new Kosovan\u00a0constitution. The Kosovan delegation, led by the KLA, finally accepted the\u00a0revisedproposals (on 18 March) on the understanding that three years after the\u00a0interim settlement the future status of Kosovo would be decided by a\u00a0referendum. This would achieve their long proclaimed goal of\u00a0independence. The Serb\/FRY delegation refused to sign, but offered further\u00a0negotiations.<\/p>\n Looking back over the diplomatic efforts, three things stand out.<\/p>\n First, there was the contradiction between trying to keep Kosovo within the\u00a0Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and acting on the assumption that its\u00a0population had to be protected against the Yugoslav government. This\u00a0was eventually overcome when US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright\u00a0assured the KLA that it would be allowed to take Kosovo out of Yugoslavia. But\u00a0this meant the Serbs would refuse to sign the accord.<\/p>\n Second was the assumption that the Serbian government headed by\u00a0Milosevic was a criminal organization. This led to implementation terms so harsh\u00a0that the Serbian government were bound to refuse them. I draw your attention\u00a0particularly to one of the implementation clauses. This reads:<\/p>\n NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels,\u00a0aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded\u00a0access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial\u00a0waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac,\u00a0maneuver, billet and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for\u00a0support, training, and operations.<\/p>\n The Berliner Zeitung noted that: ‘This passage sounds like a surrender\u00a0treaty following a war that was lost’. Another newspaper, Taz, commented\u00a0‘If the talks had really had the aim of producing agreement, and not\u00a0merely trying to convince skeptics of the unavoidability of NATO’s attacks,\u00a0then the text of the Accord is incomprehensible’.10<\/p>\n The third point is the virtual exclusion of Russia from the diplomatic\u00a0effort. Apart from historic reasons, Russia is far closer to the\u00a0combustible material of the Balkans than the United States or Britain,\u00a0not least because it has large Islamic populations. Caught in the coils of\u00a0its own financial and political crisis it was in no fit state to take part\u00a0in the diplomacy of the autumn of 1998. At Rambouillet it contributed\u00a0little either to the proposals for a political settlement or to the\u00a0implementation provisions. Its role was more like that of a resentful bystander. It\u00a0quelled Serb intransigence, but accepted the NATO position with mental\u00a0reservations. This attitude seems to have continued up to the present.<\/p>\n As Serbia’s traditional protector, the Russians should have concentrated\u00a0on making sure the Serbs were presented with a document they could sign up\u00a0to in good faith. But they lacked the diplomatic skill, coherence, and\u00a0confidence to achieve this outcome. And, it must be said, they were\u00a0never regarded as more than the fifth wheel in the diplomatic coach. As a\u00a0result of NATO’s determination to punish the FRY and Russia’s diplomatic\u00a0incompetence, Milosevic was presented terms which no democratically\u00a0accountable head of state could have accepted.<\/p>\n Mr. Blair asked. thirdly. ‘Are there military operations we can\u00a0sensibly and prudently undertake’? In the Yugoslav context, this question is\u00a0about the kind of war which could have been expected to avert the ‘impending\u00a0humanitarian catastrophe’.<\/p>\n Let us be clear about results so far. The actual war we have fought has\u00a0led to the mass exodus of Albanian Kosovars from Kosovo. The first refugees\u00a0fled from Kosovo after the bombing started on 24 March; since then over\u00a0800,000 Kosovars have fled or been deported, and many Serbs have also\u00a0fled. Kosovo has been almost emptied of its population. In addition, several\u00a0thousand Serbs outside Kosovo have been killed accidentally, and much\u00a0of the infrastructure of the country destroyed.<\/p>\n I draw your attention to what Robert Hayden, director of the Centre for\u00a0Russian and European Studies at Pittsburgh University wrote a few weeks\u00a0ago: ‘The casualties among Serb civilians in the first three weeks are\u00a0higher than all the casualties on both sides in Kosovo in the three\u00a0months which led up to this war, and yet these three months were supposed to\u00a0be a humanitarian catastrophe’.11<\/p>\n It may be that in the end most Kosovars will go back and a huge\u00a0Marshall Aid programme will make the Balkans flow with milk and honey and\u00a0everyone will live happily ever after. But at this moment in time the war has\u00a0worsened the humanitarian situation. And even if its results improve it\u00a0eventually, can we be reasonably confident that the improvement will be\u00a0great enough to make up for the evils of the transition?<\/p>\n As is well known, NATO’s military strategy was based on the refusal to\u00a0accept casualties. This not only excluded the use of ground troops from the start; it also excluded low level air sorties targetted on Serb troop\u00a0concentrations in Kosovo. This meant that the air campaign had to be\u00a0aimed at what was called ‘degrading’ Serbia’s infrastructure. Because the\u00a0assembled ground troops were ordered not to fight for the people they\u00a0had come to protect, a clear link was never established between the\u00a0humanitarian and military objectives; and the morality of the war\u00a0itself was impugned.<\/p>\n To wage a ‘holy war’ without willingness to accept sacrifices is a new\u00a0phenomenon in human history. There may have been an element of\u00a0wish-fulfilment here. Some of the political talk was of a Serb\u00a0capitulation in a few days. But the wish was clearly father to the thought that no\u00a0body bags on our side would be acceptable.<\/p>\n At a deeper level, wish-fulfilment seems to have been a necessary\u00a0element in the whole operation. A number of commentators clearly saw that only\u00a0the immediate deployment of ground troops could avert a ‘humanitarian\u00a0catastrophe’. Unlike me, most of these analysts were supporters of\u00a0military intervention. For example, Mary Kaldor: ‘Air strikes cannot prevent\u00a0this kind of violence and may exacerbate it’.12 Or Timothy Garton Ash:\u00a0“Rather than bombing Serbian towns, we should be liberating Kosovan\u00a0villages”.13 Both pointed out, additionally, that air strikes unite the afflicted\u00a0country behind its rulers, crippling domestic opposition to disastrous\u00a0policies.<\/p>\n What these critics fail to recognise is that there was never majority\u00a0support, except perhaps in Britain, for an opposed invasion of Kosovo.<\/p>\n Thisis not because the West is decadent – the British after all were\u00a0willing to accept substantial casualties to defend the Falklands – but because no\u00a0perceived national interests were involved. People are not yet prepared\u00a0to die, or allow their soldiers to be killed, for the ‘international\u00a0community’. It wasn’t politically possible for NATO to fight the kind\u00a0of war needed to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. This suggests to me\u00a0that by the time the bombing started anger with Milosevic, not concern for the\u00a0safety of the Kosovars, was the dominating emotion in the American and\u00a0British leadership.<\/p>\n In the last few weeks I have often been asked: ‘But would you have just\u00a0stood idly by and done nothing?’ This assumes that there were no\u00a0alternatives to what was actually done. But had the concept of ‘damage\u00a0limitation’ rather than punishing Serbia been the lodestar of the\u00a0diplomatic efforts, a whole range of alternatives would have disclosed\u00a0itself – from economic sanctions or even bribes to making sure that an\u00a0enlarged force of UN and OSCE monitors were kept on the ground. If\u00a0there is one thing which history teaches us it is that monstrous acts can only\u00a0be performed in dark places away from prying eyes. I don’t believe that\u00a0with a sufficient force of monitors on the ground in Kosovo either genocide or\u00a0ethnic cleansing would have been possible, in the commonly accepted\u00a0meaning of these terms. There was always a trade-off between prolonged but\u00a0troubled peace under the watchful eye of the world and the evils of war under\u00a0the protection of an informational blackout.<\/p>\n The PM’s fourth and fifth questions can be taken together, and much\u00a0more briefly. ‘Are we prepared for the long term?’, ‘And do we have national\u00a0interests involved?’ Mr. Blair partially answered the second by saying:\u00a0‘the mass expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo demanded notice\u00a0from the rest of the world. But it does make a difference that it is taking\u00a0place in a combustible part of Europe’. Had his Chicago speech been\u00a0couched in regional, rather than doctrinal, terms, it would have been far more\u00a0acceptable to prudentialists[TJF8], though even here I must point out\u00a0that those NATO countries nearest to the “combustible parts” were the most\u00a0reluctant to take military action. As to whether we are prepared for\u00a0thelong term, time will tell.<\/p>\n My conclusion, as I was taught at school, should follow from my\u00a0premises. I announced myself to you as a prudentialist and have presented a\u00a0prudentialist critique of the war. I do not deny that the international\u00a0system needs to be revised to meet changing realities. But in trying to\u00a0revise it unilaterally, in terms of universalist principles which are\u00a0not universally shared, we – Clinton and Blair particularly – have taken\u00a0immense risks with the future of international relations, without\u00a0having secured the long-term future of the Kosovars themselves. These risks\u00a0may turn out well, but we should not count on it.<\/p>\n I am left with an immense sense of pity, for the Kosovars whom we\u00a0claimed to help, for the Serbians whom we aimed to punish. Above all, I am left\u00a0with an abiding image of Olympian thunderbolts being rained from the\u00a0skies by the ‘children of light’ – the avenging angels of Blair’s ‘new\u00a0doctrineof the international community’.<\/p>\n Notes on the Author:<\/strong><\/p>\n Professor Lord Robert Skidelsky<\/p>\n ACADEMIC CAREER<\/p>\n Research Fellow, Nuffield College, Oxford, 1965-68<\/p>\n Associate Professor, School of Advanced International Studies, John<\/p>\n Hopkins University, 1970-76<\/p>\n Head of History, Philosophy and European Studies, Polytechnic of North<\/p>\n London, 1976-78<\/p>\n Professor of International Studies, University of Warwick, 1978-90<\/p>\n Professor of Political Economy, University of Warwick, 1990-<\/p>\n PUBLICATIONS<\/p>\n Politicians and the Slump, 1967<\/p>\n Oswald Mosley, 1975<\/p>\n John Maynard Keynes, Vol. 1, 1983<\/p>\n John Maynard Keynes, Vol. 2, 1992<\/p>\n The World After Communism, 1995<\/p>\n AWARDS<\/p>\n Wolfson Prize for History, 1992<\/p>\n FELLOWSHIPS<\/p>\n Royal Historical Society, 1973<\/p>\n Royal Society of Literature, 1978<\/p>\n British Academy, 1994<\/p>\n Footnotes<\/strong><\/p>\n 1 Mark Almond, “What have we started?”, Independent on Sunday, 6 June<\/p>\n 1999;<\/p>\n 2 Mary Kaldor, Prospect, April 1999;<\/p>\n 3 Dr Viktor Gobarev, “Feeling Threatened”, World Today, June 1999<\/p>\n 4 See the illuminating discussion in Marc Weller, “The Rambouillet<\/p>\n Conference on Kosovo”, International Affairs, Vol.75,No.2, April 1999,<\/p>\n pp.213 8<\/p>\n 5 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I, Article I ( 1,4,7); Chapter<\/p>\n 7<\/p>\n (Articles 39,42,51)<\/p>\n 6 UN “Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble.<\/p>\n 7 Written answer, House of Commons, Hansard 26 April 1999, vol.330,<\/p>\n col.35w. The legal issues are set out in a written question by Lord\u00a0Kennet in the House of Lords and the reply by the Home Office Minister,\u00a0Baroness Symons. Lord Kennet asked: Whether the concept of ‘overwhelming\u00a0<\/span>humanitarian necessity’ (as now\u00a0used by the Government in connection with the possible use of force by NATO\u00a0in the context of Kosovo) is recognised in international law; and whether\u00a0there is a consensus within the United Nations Security Council: (a) on\u00a0the meaning and legal validity of the concept; (b)on the authority it may\u00a0confer on states or groups of states proposing to use military force in\u00a0the absence of a United Nations Security Council Resolution specifically\u00a0requiring or permitting the use of force; and Whether ‘overwhelming humanitarian\u00a0\u00a0<\/span>necessity’ overrides other principles of international law; and, if so, how are the\u00a0\u00a0<\/span>circumstances in which it may do so to be recognised by the international community;\u00a0<\/span>and by whom should they be recognised if military action is lawfully to follow; and\u00a0Whether unilateral declarations alleging ‘overwhelming humanitarian\u00a0necessity’ may confer legality on threats or uses of force or\u00a0inteference within sovereign states that would otherwise be unlawful; and\u00a0Whether the concept of ‘overwhelming humanitarian necessity’ and\u00a0related legal doctrines have been considered by the International Court at the\u00a0Hague.<\/p>\n In reply Baroness Symons stated:<\/p>\n There is no general doctrine of humanitarian necessity in international\u00a0law. Cases have nevertheless arisen (as in Iraq in 1991) when, in the\u00a0light of all the circumstances, a limited use of force was justifiable in\u00a0support of purposes laid down by the Security Council but without the council’s\u00a0express authorisation when this was the only means to avert an\u00a0immediate and overwhelming human catastrophe. Such cases would in the\u00a0<\/span>nature of things be exceptional and would depend on an objective assessment of\u00a0the factual circumstances at the time and on the terms of relevant\u00a0decisions ofthe Security Council bearing on that question. (HL Hansard,Was,\u00a0139-140, 16 November 1998)<\/p>\n 8 Security Council Resolution 1203, 24 October 1998<\/p>\n 9 William Rees Mogg reaches the same conclusion: see The Times, 31 May<\/p>\n 1999<\/p>\n 10 “Interim Agreement for Peace and Self Government in Kosovo”,\u00a0Rambouillet, France 23 February 1999, Appendix B. “Status of Multi\u00a0National Military Implementation Force”, clause 8. For newspaper comments, see<\/p>\n Peter Schwartz, “Rambouillet Accord Foresaw the poccupation of the whole of\u00a0Yugoslavia, 14 April 1999<\/p>\n 11 Quoted Noam Chomsky, “Is this really a grand Nato victory?”, 14 June\u00a01999<\/p>\n 12 Mary Kaldor, op.cit.<\/p>\n