{"id":1440,"date":"2020-05-01T10:20:07","date_gmt":"2020-05-01T09:20:07","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/?page_id=1440"},"modified":"2020-05-01T10:25:10","modified_gmt":"2020-05-01T09:25:10","slug":"clinton-had-a-chance-to-avoid-kosovo-bombing","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/clinton-had-a-chance-to-avoid-kosovo-bombing\/","title":{"rendered":"CLINTON HAD A CHANCE TO AVOID KOSOVO BOMBING"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>The Colorado Springs Gazette October 12 2000<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.gazette.com\/daily\/opin2.html\">http:\/\/www.gazette.com\/daily\/opin2.html<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Alan J. Parrington: CLINTON HAD A CHANCE TO AVOID KOSOVO BOMBING<\/p>\n<p>Now that Slobodan Milosevic has been voted out of office, many in the\u00a0Clinton Administration will be celebrating the 1999 bombing of<br \/>\nYugoslavia as a completed moral victory. We were told after all, that<br \/>\nthe war was fought for humanitarian reasons &#8211; to stop genocide and<br \/>\nethnic cleansing &#8211; and that it was started only after all diplomatic<br \/>\nefforts had failed. With Kosovo free and Milosevic vanquished, the<br \/>\nwar is finally won. It was a good war.<\/p>\n<p>As the U.S. Air Attache in London at the time, I saw a different war,<br \/>\none not so flattering or altruistic. I saw a war of underlying<br \/>\nmotives, missed diplomatic opportunities, misguided military<br \/>\nstrategies and questionable outcomes. Worst of all, the war never<br \/>\nneed happened: Milosevic conceded major U.S. demands two weeks before\u00a0the war began.<\/p>\n<p>On the evening of March 11, 1999, I was confronted by the Yugoslavian\u00a0Defence Attache to the Court of St. James at a British diplomatic\u00a0reception and told, &#8220;Milosevic has decided to accept international,\u00a0even NATO, troops in Kosovo, but he must first have (a) letter from\u00a0Clinton explaining the benefits Yugoslavia will receive (in<br \/>\nexchange).&#8221; I stood there silent, somewhat dumbfounded, as the<br \/>\ndeployment of foreign troops had been the sticking point in<br \/>\nnegotiations. The Serb colonel repeated his statement verbatim,<br \/>\nquestioning if I had understood the import of his message.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Yes,&#8221; I assured him, &#8220;I understand perfectly, but what benefits are<br \/>\nyou talking about?&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;I myself do not know,&#8221; he answered, &#8220;But Holbrooke knows!&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Richard Holbrooke, author of the Dayton Accord on Bosnia, had been\u00a0shuttling back and forth to Belgrade trying to find a peaceful\u00a0solution to the Kosovo crisis. He had left Belgrade the day before to\u00a0consult with Washington and was due back in Yugoslavia that weekend.\u00a0He apparently carried with him a detailed brief of the Milosevic\u00a0offer.<\/p>\n<p>The timing, place and presence of other diplomats cut short my<br \/>\ndiscussion with the Serb, but by coincidence I had dinner with him at<br \/>\nthe home of a fellow attache a few days later. I asked if he had<br \/>\nlearned any more about the benefits he had spoken of during our last\u00a0encounter. &#8220;I can only speak for myself,&#8221; he answered, &#8220;but there are\u00a0only three things Yugoslavia must have: Yugoslavia must keep\u00a0sovereignty over Kosovo, the terrorists (i.e. the Kosovo Liberation\u00a0Army) must be disarmed, and the referendum (on independence for\u00a0Kosovo) must be removed.&#8221; It was apparently too much for the Clinton\u00a0Administration to accept as Holbrooke&#8217;s shuttle diplomacy failed and\u00a0the bombing began March 24.<\/p>\n<p>The war that was supposed to last three days ran into weeks, then<br \/>\nmonths, and had all the appearances of lasting well into the future<br \/>\nwhen, ironically, Russia stepped in and brokered a peace. The war<br \/>\nended June 10 with the United Nations accepting responsibility for<br \/>\nKosovo. When I read the agreement, I was not surprised to see the<br \/>\nthree Yugoslavian demands had been met or that each side had spun the\u00a0agreement into a victory for their side. Such is the nature of\u00a020th-century politics. But I began to wonder why it had taken so much\u00a0blood to come back to the same starting point as before the war\u00a0began. There were lots of explanations I reasoned, but none that fit\u00a0the scenario comfortably, save one.<\/p>\n<p>I came to the conclusion &#8211; hypothesis really &#8211; that the war had not<br \/>\nbeen about humanitarian issues at all. Like most wars it had been<br \/>\nabout politics. In this case, the objective all along had been to get<br \/>\nrid of Milosevic, Europe&#8217;s last reigning communist, and whose<br \/>\nvirulent nationalism had set the region ablaze, sending millions of<br \/>\nrefugees fleeing to the West where they were not wanted or welcomed.<\/p>\n<p>It was difficult to gauge when Milosevic became the target of the<br \/>\nadministration&#8217;s Balkan policy, perhaps as early as 1995 following<br \/>\nthe debacle in Bosnia. State appointments and initiatives from that<br \/>\ntime seem to support that theory. In any case, it all hinged on<br \/>\ncornering the Serb leader in a war he could not win and for whom<br \/>\ncapitulation or defeat would spell disaster. Milosevic&#8217;s Waterloo was<br \/>\nthought to be Kosovo, his Achilles heel to be bombing. This is where<br \/>\nthe strategy went awry.<\/p>\n<p>It is one of the enduring myths of the 20th century that strategic<br \/>\nbombing will compel a weak power to throw in the towel and dump an\u00a0unpopular leader. In practice, the opposite has always been true and\u00a0even the most unpopular dictators have been made into national heroes\u00a0by the symbiotic logic that befalls strategic bombardment. Most\u00a0American administrations, captured by the omnipotence of their own\u00a0polls, have been slow to grasp this reality and have repeatedly\u00a0reached for the strategic bomber or missile as an easy way to avoid\u00a0hard choices.<\/p>\n<p>The Clinton administration was no different. Three days at most, it<br \/>\nwas claimed, and Milosevic will be history. But in Yugoslavia, as in<br \/>\nIraq and elsewhere, the bombing backfired and rallied disparate<br \/>\nSerbian political parties around a common foreign enemy. After 11<br \/>\nweeks of bombing, the administration, running short of precision<br \/>\nweapons and faced with the prospect of a bloody ground war, abandoned\u00a0the bombing strategy and asked the Russians to broker a deal based\u00a0upon Milosevic&#8217;s antebellum offer. The war achieved no more than was\u00a0offered by Milosevic at the beginning and only inflamed ethnic\u00a0passions for generations to come.<\/p>\n<p>It is a Pyrrhic victory to now claim that the bombing served its<br \/>\npurpose. Kosovo remains a part of Yugoslavia, the independence<br \/>\nreferendum has been cancelled, ethnic cleansing continues (albeit<br \/>\nreversed in terms of nationalities), and NATO has been stuck with the\u00a0impossible task of disarming the KLA. As one KLA leader told me, &#8220;One\u00a0day the Serbs will be selling us guns to shoot at NATO!&#8221; Even new\u00a0Yugoslavian President Vojislav Kostunica has been quoted as saying,\u00a0&#8220;We cannot forget what some countries did to us last year during the\u00a0NATO bombing.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Benjamin Franklin believed that there is no such thing as a good war,<br \/>\nnor is there a bad peace. Democratic forces brought about Milosevic&#8217;s\u00a0demise, not bombs or bullets. Milosevic was widely hated before the\u00a0war ever began. Advocates of the Clinton doctrine might think on\u00a0these dilemmas and well consider the old sage&#8217;s advice before\u00a0launching any new moralistic adventures. War is at best a necessary\u00a0evil that should be invoked only in the most extreme of situations.\u00a0Getting rid of Milosevic was not one of them<\/p>\n<p>&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-<\/p>\n<p><em>Alan J. Parrington, of Monument, served as U.S. air attache to the<\/em><br \/>\n<em>Court of St. James in London during the Kosovo campaign. He retired\u00a0from the Air Force with the rank of colonel at the beginning of this\u00a0year.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The Colorado Springs Gazette October 12 2000 http:\/\/www.gazette.com\/daily\/opin2.html Alan J. Parrington: CLINTON HAD A CHANCE TO AVOID KOSOVO BOMBING Now that Slobodan Milosevic has been voted out of office, many in the\u00a0Clinton Administration will be celebrating the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia as a completed moral victory. We were told after all, that the war was &hellip; <\/p>\n<p class=\"link-more\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/clinton-had-a-chance-to-avoid-kosovo-bombing\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;CLINTON HAD A CHANCE TO AVOID KOSOVO BOMBING&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v18.2 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>CLINTON HAD A CHANCE TO AVOID KOSOVO BOMBING - Balkan Conflicts Research Team<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/clinton-had-a-chance-to-avoid-kosovo-bombing\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_GB\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"CLINTON HAD A CHANCE TO AVOID KOSOVO BOMBING - Balkan Conflicts Research Team\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The Colorado Springs Gazette October 12 2000 http:\/\/www.gazette.com\/daily\/opin2.html Alan J. 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Parrington: CLINTON HAD A CHANCE TO AVOID KOSOVO BOMBING Now that Slobodan Milosevic has been voted out of office, many in the\u00a0Clinton Administration will be celebrating the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia as a completed moral victory. 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