{"id":1532,"date":"2020-05-25T12:05:22","date_gmt":"2020-05-25T11:05:22","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/?page_id=1532"},"modified":"2020-05-25T12:52:23","modified_gmt":"2020-05-25T11:52:23","slug":"1532-2","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/1532-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Do You Remember Kosovo? – Mark Littman QC"},"content":{"rendered":"

 <\/p>\n

DO YOU\u00a0 <\/span>REMEMBER KOSOVO ?\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

MARK\u00a0 <\/span>LITTMAN Q.C.\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

1<\/i><\/b>ST <\/i><\/b>NOVEMBER 2004\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

Second\u00a0 <\/span>impression 22nd November 2004\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

Comments on first impression:\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

Lord Carrington <\/b>(UK Foreign\u00a0 <\/span>Secretary 1979-1982, Secretary General of NATO 1984-1988, Chairman European\u00a0 <\/span>Conference on Yugoslavia 1990-1992):\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/i><\/b>“I am so\u00a0 <\/span>glad you published this booklet and I hope it gets a very wide distribution”\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

Tony Benn <\/b>:<\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0“Short,\u00a0 <\/span>clear and immensely powerful\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/b>pamphlet “<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

Sir Sidney\u00a0 <\/span>Kentridge QC <\/b>:<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

“Your pamphlet on Kosovo is devastating.\u00a0\u00a0 I hope it is being well circulated.\u00a0\u00a0 I cannot conceive of any rational answer to it”\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

Sir Simon Jenkins <\/b>:<\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0“Spot on!”\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

PREFACE\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/i><\/p>\n

In\u00a0 <\/span>November 1999, the <\/i>Centre for Policy Studies, London <\/i>,\u00a0 <\/span>published my pamphlet, <\/i>“<\/i><\/b>Kosovo:\u00a0 <\/span>Law and Diplomacy <\/i>“<\/i><\/b>.<\/i><\/p>\n

The\u00a0 <\/span>present pamphlet is produced as an epilogue to bring matters up to date in the\u00a0 <\/span>light of material that has become available in the last five years.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/i>\u00a0Mark Littman Q.C.\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

12\u00a0 <\/span>Gray’s Inn Square\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

London WC1R 5JP\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

“<\/i><\/b>DO\u00a0 <\/span>YOU REMEMBER KOSOVO ? <\/b>“<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

THE WAR\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

Five years\u00a0 <\/span>ago NATO launched a war against Yugoslavia.\u00a0 It lasted 11 weeks, from 25 th March to the 10 th June 1999.\u00a0 Since the population of the member\u00a0 <\/span>states of NATO was 600 million and that of Yugoslavia only 10 million the result\u00a0 <\/span>of the war was not in doubt.\u00a0 It concluded with an occupation of Kosovo\u00a0 by an\u00a0 <\/span>international force with NATO at its core.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

WAS THE WAR JUSTIFIED ?\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b>Yugoslavia and all the members of NATO were members of the UN.\u00a0 They were thus parties to\u00a0 <\/span>the Charter which, as a treaty subscribed to by virtually every state in the\u00a0 <\/span>world, has the force of international law.\u00a0 By the terms of the Charter the\u00a0 <\/span>exercise of force by one member state against another is prohibited 1except in two cases; where a state is attacked, in which case it may defend\u00a0 <\/span>itself ; or where authorised by the Security Council .2\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>No member of NATO had been attacked by Yugoslavia and there had been no Security\u00a0 <\/span>Council resolution authorising the attack.\u00a0 So, on the face of it the attack was\u00a0 <\/span>unlawful.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b>Some,\u00a0 <\/span>however, contended that a legal basis for the war could be found 3.\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>It was not suggested that it could be found in the terms of the Charter.\u00a0 What\u00a0 <\/span>was argued was that it could be found in a principle of customary law taking\u00a0 <\/span>effect alongside the Charter.\u00a0 This suggestion was quoted the day hostilities\u00a0 <\/span>began by George Robertson , UK Defence Secretary in the following terms:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b>We are in no doubt that NATO\u00a0 <\/span>is acting within international law.\u00a0 Our legal justification rests upon the\u00a0 <\/span>accepted principle that force may be used in extreme circumstances to avert a\u00a0 <\/span>humanitarian disaster. <\/i>4<\/i><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/i><\/b>The existence of such an “<\/i><\/b>accepted\u00a0 <\/span>principle “<\/i><\/b>and the application of such a principle (if it existed at all) to the present\u00a0 <\/span>case, were strongly contested by others 5,\u00a0 <\/span>so that at that time the matter remained in contention.\u00a0 However, since then\u00a0 <\/span>there have reports from two public enquiries which have placed the illegality of\u00a0 <\/span>the NATO attack beyond serious doubt. 6\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>It cannot now be seriously doubted that the NATO attack on Yugoslavia was in breach of international law.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

REPORT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS\u00a0 <\/span>COMMITTEE\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

The first enquiry was\u00a0 <\/span>conducted by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons .\u00a0 This\u00a0 <\/span>committee consisted of 12 MPs of whom 7 were Labour.\u00a0 It dealt with the legality\u00a0 <\/span>of the war in a section entitled “<\/i><\/b>Was\u00a0 <\/span>military intervention legal ? “<\/i><\/b>\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>This was drafted after receiving evidence from several experts on public\u00a0 <\/span>international law.\u00a0 None of these experts suggested that any authority for war\u00a0 <\/span>was to be found in the terms of the Charter.\u00a0 So the Committee\u00a0<\/span>held :\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b>Our\u00a0 <\/span>conclusion is that Operation Allied Force was contrary to the specific terms of\u00a0 <\/span>what might be termed the basic law of the international community- the UN\u00a0 <\/span>Charter\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/i><\/b>One witness did argue that\u00a0 <\/span>the war was justified by a new customary right of humanitarian intervention\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>that\u00a0 had been developed by state practice in the 10 previous years.\u00a0 The\u00a0 <\/span>Committee held, however , that no such right had developed.\u00a0 The Committee\u00a0 <\/span>concluded:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b>that,\u00a0 <\/span>at the very least, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has a tenuous basis\u00a0 <\/span>in current international customary law, and that this renders the NATO action\u00a0 <\/span>legally questionable <\/i>7<\/i>.<\/i><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/i><\/b>The second enquiry was\u00a0 <\/span>conducted by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo .\u00a0 This Commission\u00a0 <\/span>was established upon the initiative of the King of Sweden under the chairmanship\u00a0 <\/span>of the South African Judge Goldstein.\u00a0 On the question of the legality of the\u00a0 <\/span>NATO war it reported:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b>“<\/i><\/b>the\u00a0 <\/span>NATO campaign was illegal….. <\/i>“<\/i><\/b>8<\/i><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

SHOULD\u00a0 <\/span>THERE BE A CHANGE IN THE LAW ?\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b>Both reports went on to\u00a0 <\/span>discuss whether the law should be changed so as to admit a doctrine of “<\/i><\/b>humanitarian\u00a0 <\/span>interference “<\/i><\/b>in the future, such a change to be brought about either by an amendment to the\u00a0 <\/span>Charter or by future state practice.\u00a0 This question is addressed later in this\u00a0 <\/span>paper but it does not affect the question with which this paper is primarily\u00a0 <\/span>concerned, namely whether this war was justified under existing law.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

WAS THE\u00a0 <\/span>WAR, EVEN THOUGH ILLEGAL, MORALLY JUSTIFIABLE ?\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b>Although both reports found\u00a0 <\/span>the NATO action to be illegal, they both expressed the view that it was morally\u00a0 <\/span>justified or “<\/i><\/b>legitimate “<\/i><\/b>.\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>Can this view be supported in the light of the material that has emerged in the\u00a0 <\/span>past five years ?\u00a0 It is submitted that it cannot.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The moral justification for\u00a0 <\/span>the war is expressed in the two reports as follows:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

Select\u00a0 <\/span>Committee\u00a0 on Foreign Affairs\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b>The Select Committee\u00a0 <\/span>reported that:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b>NATO’s\u00a0 <\/span>military action, if of dubious legality in the current state of international\u00a0 <\/span>law, was justifiable on moral grounds. <\/i>9<\/i><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b>It came to this conclusion\u00a0 <\/span>on the ground that:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b>“<\/i><\/b>a\u00a0 <\/span>humanitarian emergency existed before NATO intervened and that a humanitarian\u00a0 <\/span>catastrophe would have occurred….. if intervention had not taken place. <\/i>“<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

Independent International Commission on Kosovo\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The Commission reported :\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

… that\u00a0 <\/span>the NATO campaign was illegal yet legitimate.<\/i><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The reason for the\u00a0 <\/span>conclusion that it was “<\/i><\/b>legitimate “<\/i><\/b>is not explicitly stated but its general drift can be discerned in such passages\u00a0 <\/span>as:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

…the\u00a0 <\/span>overall protection of people against gross abuse ….\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/i>…an\u00a0 <\/span>impending and unfolding humanitarian catastrophe……\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

POSITION\u00a0 <\/span>OF U.K. GOVERNMENT \u2014\u00a0NO LEGITIMACY WITHOUT\u00a0 <\/span>LEGALITY\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

The view of these two\u00a0 <\/span>bodies that the war, although unlawful, was nevertheless “<\/i><\/b>legitimate “<\/i><\/b>does not have any relevance in considering the position of the United Kingdom since HMG has always\u00a0 <\/span>accepted that without legality there could be no legitimacy.\u00a0 Thus:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b>…any\u00a0 <\/span>military action by British forces would have to be lawful under international\u00a0 <\/span>law.\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

Tony Lloyd, Minister of\u00a0 <\/span>State, Foreign Office, 3rd February 1999\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

I say\u00a0 <\/span>very firmly that the United Kingdom has acted\u00a0 <\/span>and will continue to act in conformity with international law\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

John Morris, Attorney\u00a0 <\/span>General, at the International Court <\/b>of Justice , 11 th May1999\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Since, however, the\u00a0 <\/span>question of morality may affect the minds of some people, even if not the\u00a0 <\/span>British Government, it will now be addressed.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

“<\/i><\/b>MORAL <\/b>“<\/i><\/b>or <\/b>“<\/i><\/b>LEGITIMATE\u00a0 <\/span>? <\/b>“<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b>Readers of the two reports\u00a0 <\/span>mentioned above and the Robertson statement a year after the end of the war will\u00a0 <\/span>gain a picture of unprovoked violence by the Serbs against the persons and\u00a0 <\/span>property of the Kosova Albanians spread over a prolonged period of some years\u00a0 <\/span>and resulting in the Albanians being violently driven not only from their\u00a0 <\/span>villages but even from the whole province of Kosovo.\u00a0 The argument proceeds that\u00a0 <\/span>the NATO war was justified as being the only practical means of preventing or\u00a0 <\/span>reversing such\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

In considering these\u00a0 <\/span>matters it is essential to bear in mind that the critical question is whether\u00a0 <\/span>NATO was justified in starting the war.\u00a0 Once the war was started dreadful\u00a0 <\/span>things were done on both sides, as was seen on television in the shots of the\u00a0 <\/span>death and destruction caused by NATO and of the tragic flight of the Albanian\u00a0 <\/span>civilians into Albania and\u00a0 <\/span>Macedonia.\u00a0 That is the nature of war and these things would not have happened\u00a0 <\/span>if NATO had never started the war.\u00a0 That is why war should be avoided if at all\u00a0 <\/span>possible.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

On the material now\u00a0 <\/span>available, five years later, it can be demonstrated that there was no\u00a0 <\/span>justification for the NATO attack.\u00a0 A review undertaken now after 5 years shows\u00a0 <\/span>the NATO war was unnecessary, ill-founded, disproportionate, and contrary to the\u00a0 <\/span>public interest.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0(1) Unnecessary\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b>It is now plain that, even\u00a0 <\/span>if the criticisms of the Serbs were well-founded, the NATO campaign was\u00a0 <\/span>unnecessary, since the Yugoslav government had, before the bombing started,\u00a0 <\/span>accepted that there should be “<\/i><\/b>substantial\u00a0 <\/span>autonomy for Kosovo, [including] mechanisms for free and fair elections to\u00a0 <\/span>democratic institutions, for the governance of Kosovo, for the protection of\u00a0 <\/span>human rights, and the rights of national communities, and for the establishment\u00a0 <\/span>of a fair judicial system. “<\/i><\/b>It had also agreed to accept “<\/i><\/b>an\u00a0 <\/span>international civilian and military presence in Kosovo “<\/i><\/b>for the implementation of the agreement. 10\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

It is therefore plain that\u00a0 <\/span>the war was unnecessary.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Before the NATO attack,\u00a0 <\/span>NATO insisted as a condition of the settlement that Yugoslavia should also\u00a0 <\/span>submit to military clauses that provided for NATO occupation not only of Kosovo\u00a0 <\/span>but of the whole of Yugoslavia, with unlimited right to locate military forces\u00a0 <\/span>there for an indefinite period, at the expense of Yugoslavia, and under\u00a0 <\/span>conditions of total immunity from liability for civil or criminal wrongs.\u00a0 NATO\u00a0 <\/span>threatened that if Yugoslavia did not immediately submit to these demands force would be used to\u00a0 <\/span>compel it to do so.\u00a0 Yugoslavia did not submit, so on 25 th March NATO\u00a0 <\/span>attacked Yugoslavia.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

In June 1999 Dr. Kissinger\u00a0 <\/span>said of these military clauses:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The <\/i>Rambouillet text <\/i>, which called on Serbia to admit\u00a0 <\/span>NATO troops throughout Yugoslavia, was a provocation, an excuse to start\u00a0 <\/span>bombing.\u00a0 Rambouillet is not a document that an angelic Serb could have\u00a0 <\/span>accepted.\u00a0 It was a terrible diplomatic document that should never have been\u00a0 <\/span>presented in that form. <\/i>11\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/i><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/i><\/p>\n

(2) Ill-founded\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

From George Robertson’s\u00a0 <\/span>statement it appears that HMG attached much importance to a document entitled Operation Horseshoe .12 \u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>The importance attached to this document is shown by the statement in\u00a0 <\/span>Robertson’s document, page 6, that:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

“<\/i><\/b>there\u00a0 <\/span>was evidence that the government of the Federal Republic of\u00a0 <\/span>Yugoslavia was planning to escalate its campaign of repression.\u00a0 The\u00a0 <\/span>international community could see a humanitarian disaster looming.\u00a0 Reluctantly,\u00a0 <\/span>NATO decided to use force. <\/i>“<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

And the reference at page\u00a0 <\/span>11,which identifies this so-called “<\/i><\/b>evidence “<\/i><\/b>:<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

In\u00a0 <\/span>early April, details were revealed of a covert Serb plan (Operation Horseshoe)\u00a0 <\/span>to forcibly expel Kosovar Albanians from Kosovo that had been drawn up months\u00a0 <\/span>beforehand.\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/i><\/p>\n

If there had been any\u00a0 <\/span>substance in this allegation, it would certainly have been used in the\u00a0 <\/span>prosecution of Milosevic on the charge of conspiracy.\u00a0 Its absence was explained\u00a0 <\/span>by Louise Arbour in Der Spiegel <\/i>27 th April, 1999, which said:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

“<\/i><\/b>as\u00a0 <\/span>to Operation Horseshoe, I have my doubts as to its capacity to prove anything <\/i>“<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

(3.)\u00a0 Disproportionate\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

The evidence for the prosecution at the\u00a0 <\/span>Milosevic trial shows that in the ten years prior to 1998, Kosovo was peaceful\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>(The transcript for\u00a0 <\/span>the trial of Milosevic at the I.C.T.Y.: evidence of Lord Ashdown pp.2397-2398 ).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

In that year KLA, well\u00a0 <\/span>armed with supplies of rifles, machine- guns and grenades from criminal elements\u00a0 <\/span>in Albania, mounted an\u00a0 <\/span>insurgency from bases in local villages, using techniques of ambush.\u00a0 It\u00a0 <\/span>attacked police and police stations and similar targets.\u00a0 This aggression was\u00a0 <\/span>met by Yugoslav forces using artillery and tanks.\u00a0 The security forces in some\u00a0 <\/span>cases set fire to houses or villages believed to be harbouring insurgents.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

This state of affairs\u00a0 <\/span>prevailed for a few weeks until October 1998 when the United States sent Richard Holbrooke as its\u00a0 <\/span>senior envoy to Belgrade to negotiate a cease-fire which was to include a\u00a0 <\/span>substantial withdrawal from Kosovo of Serbian troops and police.\u00a0 An agreement\u00a0 <\/span>was reached with the Yugoslav Government (” the Holbrook Agreement “) to that\u00a0 <\/span>effect.\u00a0 Yugoslavia carried out this agreement by reducing its forces in Kosovo,\u00a0 <\/span>very quickly, to the agreed level.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

As a result, Christopher\u00a0 <\/span>Hill, the United States’ special envoy for Kosovo, reported on the 9 th of November, 1998 that:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

… the\u00a0 <\/span>humanitarian and security situation in Kosovo has improved significantly in the\u00a0 <\/span>past few weeks.\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Similarly, on the 27 th November, 1998, Robin Cook reported to the House of Commons that:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

…most\u00a0 <\/span>refugees had returned to their settlements with only some hundred living in the\u00a0 <\/span>open.\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Shortly afterwards the KLA\u00a0 <\/span>resumed its attacks and the security forces responded causing casualties and\u00a0 <\/span>displacements on both sides.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

On 17 th March 1999 the Secretary\u00a0 <\/span>General of the UN reported to the UN:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

According to OSCE, the current security environment in Kosovo is characterised\u00a0 <\/span>by the disproportionate use of force, including mortar and tank fire by the\u00a0 <\/span>Yugoslav authorities in response to persistent attacks and provocations by the\u00a0 <\/span>Kosovo\u00a0 Albanian paramilitaries.\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/i><\/p>\n

Regular reports from the Kosovo Verification Mission for the two-month period from 22 January and 22 March 1999, passed on by NATO to\u00a0 <\/span>the UN, show that in this period the total fatalities were 27 for the Serbs and\u00a0 <\/span>30 for the Kosovo Albanians. 13 \u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>Another estimate puts the total Albanian fatalities over five months from 16\u00a0 <\/span>October 1998 to 20 March 1999) at 46; an average of 2 a week. 14<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

By contrast, in 11 weeks of\u00a0 <\/span>the NATO war from 25 March\u00a0 <\/span>1999 to 10 June 1999 NATO killed 1500 civilians and wounded 8000.\u00a0 This is an\u00a0 <\/span>average of 136 deaths a week and 30 times as many deaths as the total prior to\u00a0 <\/span>the war. [15]\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

These deaths occurred when\u00a0 <\/span>NATO dropped 23, 614 bombs inside Yugoslavia, mostly on cities.\u00a0 These included\u00a0 <\/span>355 cluster-bomb attacks each of which delivered 7,728 bomblets.\u00a0 After the end\u00a0 <\/span>of the campaign, on 16 August 1999 The Times <\/i>estimated that there were\u00a0 <\/span>still 14000 bomblets lying unexploded on the ground, a particular danger to\u00a0 <\/span>children since they looked like toys. [16]\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The G17 Group of\u00a0 <\/span>Independent Yugoslav Economists estimated the cost of the economic damage at $30\u00a0 <\/span>billion.\u00a0 The Economist Intelligence Unit made its own calculation which put the\u00a0 <\/span>total economic costs of damage inflicted by the war at $59.8 billion.\u00a0 The\u00a0 <\/span>International Institute for Strategic Studies has estimated that the total cost\u00a0 <\/span>of NATO’s decision to go to war, including economic damage in Serbia and Kosovo,\u00a0 <\/span>the military cost to NATO, and the peace keeping support for three years, at a\u00a0 <\/span>total of $97 billion.\u00a0 By comparison the total cost of the UK health service for the year 1997-8 was\u00a0 <\/span>\u00a343.6 billion, or $68.8 billion US dollars.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

Nor did the NATO bombing\u00a0 <\/span>improve the lives of people in Kosovo.\u00a0 On the contrary, the considerable\u00a0 <\/span>sufferings of the Kosovo Albanians during the war must also be attributed to\u00a0 <\/span>NATO for as was said by Lord Carrington (UK Foreign Secretary 1979-82, Secretary\u00a0 <\/span>General of NATO 1984-88, Chairman of European Conference on Yugoslavia 1990-92):\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

I think\u00a0 <\/span>what NATO did by bombing Serbia actually\u00a0 <\/span>precipitated the exodus of the Kosovo Albanians into Macedonia and Montenegro.\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>I think the bombing did cause the ethnic cleansing… NATO’s action in Kosovo\u00a0 <\/span>was mistaken… what we did made things much worse.\u00a0<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/i><\/p>\n

The damage done to Yugoslavia by the NATO war is\u00a0 <\/span>therefore, wholly disproportionate and excessive when compared to that done by\u00a0 <\/span>the Serbs in Kosovo.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Lord Carrington\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

(4) Contrary to Public Interest\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

Perhaps the most serious\u00a0 <\/span>damage caused by the NATO attack will turn out to have resulted from its\u00a0 <\/span>illegality.\u00a0 For such an important group of members of the UN (including three\u00a0 <\/span>of the Permanent Members of the Security Council) to have flouted the Charter\u00a0 <\/span>without even making an attempt to obtain the approval of the Security Council is\u00a0 <\/span>clearly against the public interest.\u00a0 So also is their subsequent refusal to\u00a0 <\/span>submit the question of legality to the decision of the International Court of\u00a0 <\/span>Justice. \u00a0The combination of these two actions may well have destroyed the\u00a0 <\/span>United Nations in its central function, the preservation of peace.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

CHANGE\u00a0 <\/span>INTERNATIONAL LAW ?\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

In addressing the question\u00a0 <\/span>of legality one has necessarily been concerned with the state of the law at the\u00a0 <\/span>material time, i.e. 5 years ago.\u00a0 Some have proposed that there should be change\u00a0 <\/span>in the law for the future so as create a new justification for the use of force\u00a0 <\/span>for humanitarian purposes.\u00a0 It is suggested that such a change might be brought\u00a0 <\/span>about either by encouragement given to a process of evolution or by an amendment\u00a0 <\/span>to the Charter.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

One must begin by observing\u00a0 <\/span>that such use of force is already lawful under the Charter if the Security\u00a0 <\/span>Council, operating the present voting system, resolves that such force is\u00a0 <\/span>necessary in the interests of international security.\u00a0 What the apologists for\u00a0 <\/span>the Kosovo intervention have to advocate and do advocate is that such a right of\u00a0 <\/span>forceful intervention should arise even in the absence of affirmative vote by\u00a0 <\/span>the Security Council.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

This points to the fact\u00a0 <\/span>that it is highly improbable that any such amendment to the Charter would ever\u00a0 <\/span>be made, for it would involve the permanent members surrendering their right of\u00a0 <\/span>veto.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Furthermore, as the\u00a0 <\/span>International Commission points out in its Report, any such amendment would\u00a0 <\/span>pre-suppose consensus on a complex code of principles laying down the\u00a0 <\/span>circumstances in which such a right of intervention would arise.\u00a0 The prospect\u00a0 <\/span>of any such consensus seems highly remote.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

In addition one must\u00a0 <\/span>anticipate strong opposition even to the principle of any such change in the\u00a0 <\/span>law.\u00a0 The grounds of such opposition are indicated by the statement of the British Foreign Office Policy Document 148 (1986) and in International\u00a0 <\/span>Law in Theory and Practice (1991) Prof. Oscar Schachter where, amongst other\u00a0 <\/span>objections, the danger of abuse is emphasised.\u00a0 It has also been pointed out\u00a0 <\/span>that the legitimising of any such right of humanitarian interference would be\u00a0 <\/span>opposed by the smaller nations for the simple reason that any such right is only\u00a0 <\/span>likely to be exercised against smaller nations by the more powerful nations.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

CONCLUSION\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

What has emerged over the\u00a0 <\/span>past five years confirms that the NATO war against Yugoslavia lacked both legal and moral\u00a0 <\/span>legitimacy.\u00a0 It set a bad example which has been followed already in Iraq with\u00a0 <\/span>catastrophic consequences., both human and material. [17] \u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>The two wars in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations have set back\u00a0 <\/span>humanity’s attempt to abolish war by at least a century.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a9Mark\u00a0 <\/span>Littman\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

22 <\/b>nd <\/b>November 2004\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Notes\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

1UN Charter Art 2 (3)(4) and 53\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

2Halsbury Laws of England 4th ed.re-issue 1996 Vol.49(1) para\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 <\/span>501\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

3E.g. Mark Weller, Centre for International Studies\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 <\/span>“Counsel”Aug 1999\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

4Att-General before ICJ 11th May 1999 used identical words\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

5″Kosovo: Law & Diplomacy” Mark Littman, Centre for Policy Studies, Nov\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 <\/span>1999, Appendix 1\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

6Report of Foreign Affairs Select Committee dated 23 May 2000 and Report\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 <\/span>of International Committee on Kosovo dated October 2000\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

7Foreign Affairs Committee (4 th Report) Kosovo , Vol. 1, HC\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 <\/span>28-1, 23 May 2000\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

8\u00a0Report of Independent International Commission on Kosovo , pg. 16\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

9\u00a0\u00a0<\/span>See note 7, paragraph 138\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

10 Statement by the “Office of the High Representative for the Contact\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 <\/span>Group” dated 23 rd February, 1999, letter dated 15 th March 1999, from the Head of the Yugoslav Delegation to the Contact\u00a0<\/span>Group Rambouillet Draft which had been agreed by 15 th March\u00a0\u00a0<\/span>1999, statement dated 23 rd February, 1999 of the Chief Serb\u00a0 <\/span>negotiator, and Resolution adopted by Serbian Assembly dated 23 rd March, 1999 offering to negotiate the composition of a monitoring force,\u00a0 <\/span>and the Rambouillet Draft Agreement articles one and two .<\/i>\u00a0See also “Kosovo: Law & Diplomacy” (supra, chapter two)\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

11 Daily Telegraph, 28 th June 1999\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

12 \u00a0“Kosovo One Year On” George Robertson, 2000\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

13 \u00a0Letter dated 23 rd March 1999 from Secretary General of NATO\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 <\/span>to Secretary General of UN\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

14 \u00a0Report of OSCE verification mission, December 1998 to June 1999\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

[15] \u00a0(Yugoslavia Country Report in Economist Intelligence Unit 3 rd Quarter 1999)\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

[16] (Yugoslavia Country Report in Economist Intelligence Unit 3 rd Quarter 1999)\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

[17] “Lancet” has recently estimated the Iraqi civilian fatalities at 100,000\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 <\/span>(mostly women and children).\u00a0 The US fatalities have\u00a0\u00a0<\/span>exceeded\u00a0 1300 and the UK fatalities have exceeded 100.\u00a0 No record\u00a0 <\/span>appears to have been kept of the Iraqi military casualties.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

_____________________________\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

  DO YOU\u00a0 REMEMBER KOSOVO ?\u00a0 MARK\u00a0 LITTMAN Q.C.\u00a0 1ST NOVEMBER 2004\u00a0 \u00a0 Second\u00a0 impression 22nd November 2004\u00a0 Comments on first impression:\u00a0 \u00a0 Lord Carrington (UK Foreign\u00a0 Secretary 1979-1982, Secretary General of NATO 1984-1988, Chairman European\u00a0 Conference on Yugoslavia 1990-1992):\u00a0 \u00a0“I am so\u00a0 glad you published this booklet and I hope it gets a very … <\/p>\n

Continue reading “Do You Remember Kosovo? – Mark Littman QC”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":[],"yoast_head":"\nDo You Remember Kosovo? - Mark Littman QC - Balkan Conflicts Research Team<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/1532-2\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_GB\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Do You Remember Kosovo? - Mark Littman QC - Balkan Conflicts Research Team\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"  DO YOU\u00a0 REMEMBER KOSOVO ?\u00a0 MARK\u00a0 LITTMAN Q.C.\u00a0 1ST NOVEMBER 2004\u00a0 \u00a0 Second\u00a0 impression 22nd November 2004\u00a0 Comments on first impression:\u00a0 \u00a0 Lord Carrington (UK Foreign\u00a0 Secretary 1979-1982, Secretary General of NATO 1984-1988, Chairman European\u00a0 Conference on Yugoslavia 1990-1992):\u00a0 \u00a0“I am so\u00a0 glad you published this booklet and I hope it gets a very … Continue reading "Do You Remember Kosovo? – Mark Littman QC"\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/1532-2\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Balkan Conflicts Research Team\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2020-05-25T11:52:23+00:00\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Estimated reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"16 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/\",\"name\":\"Balkan Conflicts Research Team\",\"description\":\"Information on recent conflicts in the Balkans\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":\"required name=search_term_string\"}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-GB\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/1532-2\/#webpage\",\"url\":\"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/1532-2\/\",\"name\":\"Do You Remember Kosovo? - Mark Littman QC - Balkan Conflicts Research Team\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2020-05-25T11:05:22+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2020-05-25T11:52:23+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/1532-2\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-GB\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/1532-2\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/1532-2\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Do You Remember Kosovo? – Mark Littman QC\"}]}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Do You Remember Kosovo? - Mark Littman QC - Balkan Conflicts Research Team","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/1532-2\/","og_locale":"en_GB","og_type":"article","og_title":"Do You Remember Kosovo? - Mark Littman QC - Balkan Conflicts Research Team","og_description":"  DO YOU\u00a0 REMEMBER KOSOVO ?\u00a0 MARK\u00a0 LITTMAN Q.C.\u00a0 1ST NOVEMBER 2004\u00a0 \u00a0 Second\u00a0 impression 22nd November 2004\u00a0 Comments on first impression:\u00a0 \u00a0 Lord Carrington (UK Foreign\u00a0 Secretary 1979-1982, Secretary General of NATO 1984-1988, Chairman European\u00a0 Conference on Yugoslavia 1990-1992):\u00a0 \u00a0“I am so\u00a0 glad you published this booklet and I hope it gets a very … Continue reading \"Do You Remember Kosovo? – Mark Littman QC\"","og_url":"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/1532-2\/","og_site_name":"Balkan Conflicts Research Team","article_modified_time":"2020-05-25T11:52:23+00:00","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_misc":{"Estimated reading time":"16 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/","name":"Balkan Conflicts Research Team","description":"Information on recent conflicts in the Balkans","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":"required name=search_term_string"}],"inLanguage":"en-GB"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/1532-2\/#webpage","url":"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/1532-2\/","name":"Do You Remember Kosovo? - Mark Littman QC - Balkan Conflicts Research Team","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/#website"},"datePublished":"2020-05-25T11:05:22+00:00","dateModified":"2020-05-25T11:52:23+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/1532-2\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-GB","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/1532-2\/"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/1532-2\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Do You Remember Kosovo? – Mark Littman QC"}]}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1532"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1532"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1532\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1536,"href":"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1532\/revisions\/1536"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.balkan-conflicts-research.com\/archive\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1532"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}